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HEARING THE DANGER OF AN ARMED FELON-ALLOWING
FOR A DETENTION HEARING UNDER THE BAIL REFORM
ACT FOR THOSE WHO UNLAWFULLY POSSESS FIREARMS
Matthew S. Miner*

This Article advocates an interpretationof the Bail Reform Act that affords courts
the ability to hold detention hearings in gun crime cases to evaluate defendants'
potential danger to the community. According to an interpretation advanced by
some courts, gun possession offenses do not constitute "crimes of violence" within
the meaning of the Act and therefore those charged with such crimes, even ifthey
have a prior felony conviction, are not subject to pre-trial detention. Arguing
against this approach, the Article looks to the Bail Reform Act, the relevantfederal
case law, and the alarming statistics concerning the growing use of firearms in
violent crimes to demonstrate that a more expansive interpretation that includes
these crimes is not only appropriate,but more consistent with the plain language
and original intent of the Act.
The Article divides the current case law into two camps: the so-called "Slim Majority Rule, "favoring the treatmenlt of unlawful firearms possession as a "crime of
violence; and the "Minority View" of case law, denying a detention hearing in
these cases. Recognizing that there is a significant split amongfederal district and
circuitcourts about whether the Bail Reform Act permits a such a hearing,the Article
carefully dissects the case law, the use of the term "crime of violence" in other
statutory contexts and the reasoningunderlying both approaches and concludes
that the "Minority View" undermines the most basic purpose of the Bail Reform
Act-to enhance public safety. As such, the Article advocates an approach that
would allow courts, at a minimum, to hold detention hearingsin gun cases to ensure that release of the accused would not pose a danger to the community.

Imagine a domestic relations incident in which a man holds his
girlfriend captive at gunpoint.1 After a brief standoff with police,
the man is arrested on a state charge relating to the domestic relations incident and federal charges based on the fact that he
possessed a firearm after being convicted of a felony offense and
*
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1.
The factual scenario described herein is intended to be illustrative and hypothetical. Nevertheless, situations like the one described above are replete in the federal case law
regarding detention and unlawful possession of firearms. See, e.g., United States v. Kyle, 49 F.
Supp. 2d 526, 527-28 (W.D. Tex. 1999) (addressing the issue of detention in a case where
the defendant, who was subject to a domestic protection order, unlawfully possessed a firearm, threatened his ex-wife and child, and had a brief standoff with police).
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made subject to a domestic restraining order.' Further imagine the
very real possibility that the state law charges are dropped based on
a lack of cooperation on the part of the victim, who has reconciled
with the offender. The federal charges are all that remain. Now
imagine that, under the law, the federal prosecutor handling the
case may not even be able to seek a detention hearing 4-much less
actually detain the violent offender-because some courts have
held that the Bail Reform Act does not allow for a detention hearing in cases involving unlawful firearms possession by a prohibited
person.5 Under this flawed approach to the Bail Reform Act, the
outcome would be the same whether the defendant's prior felony
conviction was for murder, rape, child molestation, domestic terrorism, or any other manner of violent offense. Indeed, the result
would be the same even if the defendant had just ended his term
of supervision for the prior felony offense. It would be the same
even if the ink on the domestic restraining order had not yet dried.
To address the foregoing gap in the law, this Article endeavors to
dissect the Bail Reform Act, the relevant body of federal case law,
and key facts and findings relating to violent firearms offenses to
establish that, at a minimum, courts should be able to hold a hearing to decide whether it is appropriate to detain those who
unlawfully possess firearms. The thesis of this Article mirrors the
concerns described with an overtone of dismay by Senator Michael
DeWine (R-Ohio) on January 21, 1997, on the floor of the United
States Senate:
2.
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1),(8) (2003). These statutory provisions make it a federal
crime for certain convicted felons and persons subject to domestic restraining orders to
possess a firearm in or affecting interstate commerce.
3.
"It is well documented that victims of domestic violence sometimes recant or refuse to cooperate after filing complaints against their assailants." Tom Lininger, A Better Way
to Disarm Batterers, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 525, 527 n.2 (2003) (citing Angela Corsilles, No Drop
Policies in the Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases: Guaranteeto Action or Dangerous Solution?, 63
FORDHAM L. REv. 853, 857 (1994). If the victim's lack of cooperation was caused by the offender's threats against the victim, detention would be possible under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3142(f) (2) (B) (2003), which provides for a detention hearing, irrespective of the nature
of the offense charged, where there is a serious risk that the defendant will threaten or intimidate a witness.
4.
A "detention hearing" is a "judicial or quasi judicial proceeding used to determine
the propriety of detaining a.person on bail .... " BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 450 (6th ed.
1990). In the federal system, a detention hearing is an evidentiary hearing at which ajudge
determines whether any conditions exist that would reasonably assure the appearance of the
defendant or the safety of the community if the defendant is released pending trial. See 18
U.S.C. §§ 3 14 2 (f),(g) (2003) (setting forth the federal Bail Reform Act's provisions for a
detention hearing, as well as the "factors to be considered" at such a hearing).
5.
See, e.g., United States v. Twine, 344 F.3d.987, 988 (9th Cir. 2003) ("[W]e hold that
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)-felon in possession of a firearm-is not a crime of violence for purposes
of the Bail Reform Act.").
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Under current law-the Bail Reform Act-certain dangerous
accused criminals can be denied bail ... if they have been
charged with crimes of violence. But it's unclear under current law whether [the unlawful] possession of firearms should
be considered a crime of violence.
Mr. President, let us do a reality check on this. If someone
who is a known convicted felon is walking around with a gun,
what's the likelihood
that person is carrying the gun for law6
abiding purposes?
The answer to Senator DeWine's rhetorical question can be answered in only one way if the concerns underlying federal firearms
laws are brought to the fore and considered in earnest. As expressed by Congress in the prefatory comments to its landmark
Gun Control Act of 1968, those concerns included, among other
things, the "increasing rate of crime and lawlessness and the growing use of firearms in violent crime."7 Clearly, Congressional
concern was not with the peaceful use of firearms, but with the
sorts of violent crimes that would occur if firearms were possessed
by certain classes of individuals.8 Accordingly, the Bail Reform Act
should be construed in a way that acknowledges the reality that
violence is a likely byproduct of the combination of firearms with
felons, fugitives, drug addicts, domestic abusers, and others prohibited by law from possessing guns.9
This issue should not be overlooked. The number of federal gun
prosecutions is sharply on the rise.' Under the Department of
6.
143 CONG. REC. 912 (1997).
7.
H.R. REP. No. 90-1577, at 4412 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4410, 4412.
8.
See, e.g., 131 CONG. REc. S9169 (daily ed. July 9, 1985) (statement of Sen. Hatch)
("[W]hen Congress enacted the Gun Control Act of 1968, its intent was to reduce violent
crime...
9.
The danger inherent in a "criminally-inclined" person's possession of a gun was
explained well by the court in United States v. Aiken:
This Court is also concerned that there is an increased risk that a criminally-inclined
individual will be more likely to use a firearm already in his possession to commit another crime. Possession of a firearm is an ongoing crime; it is a status offense. A felon
who has access to a firearm during a period of time may be more inclined to use it
and, when he does, the consequences are greater than they would be if he did not
have access to such a weapon.
775 F. Supp. 855, 856-57 (D. Md. 1991).
10.
Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Project Safe Neighborhoods: America's Network Against Gun Violence (Fact Sheet) (Jan. 30, 2003) (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform) [hereinafter Project Safe Neighborhoods Fact Sheet]
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Justice's "Project Safe Neighborhoods" initiative, gun crimes have
become a national priority." Indeed, in January 2003, the
Department of Justice labeled gun crime reduction "the top
domestic criminal justice initiative of President Bush." 2 Under that
initiative, hundreds of millions of dollars has been or will be
allocated to support what President George W. Bush has called "a
focused and vigorous effort to cut gun crime.' ' 3 Over two hundred
federal prosecutors have been hired to address the increased
caseload. 4 With more gun criminals coming into federal court, it is
increasingly important to have a uniform policy under the Bail
Reform Act to empower judges with the discretion to consider
potential danger to the community. To that end, this Article
advocates an interpretation of the Bail Reform Act that affords
courts the much-needed ability to hold detention hearings in gun
crime cases to evaluate the risk of danger to the community.
I.

THE BAIL REFORM ACT OF 1984 AND

SAFETY-BASED PRETRIAL DETENTION

Congress passed the Bail Reform Act of 1984 to give courts the
flexibility to detain potentially dangerous defendants. 5 The Act was
intended to ameliorate some of the deficiencies in the Bail Reform
Act of 1966.16 The 1966 Act attempted to reduce the number of
(describing the "[llargest recorded increase in federal firearms prosecutions" in fiscal year
2002).
11.
See, e.g., News Release, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Attorney General Statement, No. DOJ
01-296, 2001 WL 729763, at *1 (D.O.J.June 28, 2001) (discussing the launch of Project Safe
Neighborhoods, and explaining that "[a] top priority of this administration and this Department ofJustice is reducing gun crime by the vigorous enforcement of the nation's gun
laws").
12.
Project Safe Neighborhoods Fact Sheet, supra note 10.
13.
President George W. Bush, Remarks to U.S. Attorneys Conference, 2001 WL
1516904, at *1 (Nov. 29, 2001).
14.
Project Safe Neighborhoods Fact Sheet, supra note 10.
15.
See Kenneth Frederick Berg, The Bail Reform Act of 1984, 34 EMORY L.J. 685, 686
(1985) (explaining that Congress, in passing the Bail Reform Act of 1984, intended to give
courts the ability to "detain individuals who present a risk to 'the safety of any other person
and the community'" (quoting the Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, Title H
§§ 3142(b),(c),(e),(f))).
16.
COMPREHENSIVE CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1984, S. REP. No. 98-225, at 5, reprintedin
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3188 (stating in the report authorizing the passage of the 1984
amendments to the Bail Reform Act: "The constraints of the Bail Reform Act [of 1966] fail
to grant the courts the authority to impose conditions of release geared toward assuring
community safety, or the authority to deny release to those defendants who pose an especially grave risk to the safety of the community.").
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individuals who were unnecessarily detained before trial based on a
lack of means to post bail." In doing so, however, the Act had the
side-effect of reducing the ability of prosecutors and courts to ensure pretrial detention for violent offenders. " Prior to the passage
of the Bail Reform Act of 1984, courts were given the discretion to
detain individuals without bond only where such individuals posed
a risk of flight. 9 This limit on judicial and prosecutorial discretion
gave rise to what Congress termed "the alarming problem of
crimes committed by persons on release." ° The thrust of the 1984
amendment to the Bail Reform Act was to "give courts adequate
authority to make release decisions that give appropriate 2recognition to the danger a person may pose to others if released. ,
Subsequent to the passage of the 1984 amendments to the Bail
Reform Act, courts have much broader discretion in evaluating the
issue of pretrial detention. 2 That discretion, however, is
constrained by judicial interpretations of the terms and categories
that allow for a detention hearing. Under the Bail Reform Act, a
17.
The Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime explained the fundamental
flaws in the 1966 Bail Reform Act in the following manner:
The primary purpose of the [Bail Reform] Act [of 1966] was to deemphasize the use
of money bonds in the Federal courts, a practice which was perceived as resulting in
disproportionate and unnecessary pretrial incarceration of poor defendants, and to
provide a range of alternative forms of release. These goals of the Act-cutting back
on the excessive use of money bonds and providing for flexibility in setting conditions of release appropriate to the characteristics of individual defendants-are ones
which are worthy of support. However, 15 years of experience with the Act have demonstrated that, in some respects, it does not provide for appropriate release decisions.
Increasingly, the Act has come under criticism as too liberally allowing release and as
providing too little flexibility to judges in making appropriate release decisions regarding defendants who pose serious risks of flight or danger to the community.
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT CRIME, FINAL REPORT 50-51 (Aug. 7, 1981).

18.

See id.

19.

According to the Conference Committee that drafted the Bail Reform Act of 1984,

the predecessor statute, the Bail Reform Act of 1966, "adopted the concept that in noncapital cases a person is to be ordered released pretrial under those minimal conditions
reasonably required to assure his presence at trial. Danger to the community and the protection of society are not to be considered as release factors under the current law."
COMPREHENSIVE CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1984, S. REP. No. 98-225, at 4-5, reprinted in 1984

U.S.C.CAN. 3182, 3187.
20.
Id. at 3, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3185.
21.
Id.; see alsoBerg, supra note 15, at 686.
22.
See United States v. Dillard, 214 F.3d 88, 102 (2d Cir. 2000) ("A comparison of the
Bail Reform Act of 1984 with the pre-existing law shows that the principal intended 'reform'
was to expand enormously the circumstances in which defendants were to be detained prior
to trial.").

23.
Cf United States v. Connolly, No. CRIM. 3:98CR223(RNC), 1999 WL 1995186, at
*3 (D. Conn. Dec. 23, 1999) (discussing how a "court must first determine by a
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detention hearing may be held in six types of cases: (1) crimes of
violence; 4 (2) offenses for which the maximum penalty is life
imprisonment or death; 25 (3) drug offenses with a maximum
penalty of ten years or more;26 (4) crimes committed after an
individual has already been convicted of two state or federal crimes27
that would fall into any of the categories listed above;
(5) instances where there is a serious risk of flight;28 and (6) cases
preponderance of the evidence whether the defendant is eligible for pretrial detention" by
looking to the six statutory categories eligible for a detention hearing; absent such a
determination and ajudicial finding that at least one of the statutory categories applies, "the
court does not have the authority to hold a detention hearing").
24.
Title 18, United States Code, Section 3142(0 (1) (2003) provides, in relevant part:
The judicial officer shall hold a hearing to determine whether any condition or combination of conditions set forth in subsection (c) of this section will reasonably assure
the appearance of such person as required and the safety of any other person and the
community(1) upon motion of the attorney for the Government, in a case that involves(A) a crime of violence;
(B) an offense for which the maximum sentence is life imprisonment or death;
(C) an offense for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is
prescribed in the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.), the Controlled
Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 951 et seq.), or the Maritime Drug Law
Enforcement Act (46 U.S.C. App. 1901 et seq.); or
(D) any felony if such person has been convicted of two or more offenses described
in subparagraphs (A) through (C) of this paragraph, or two or more State or local offenses that would have been offenses described in subparagraphs (A) through (C) of
this paragraph if a circumstance giving rise to Federal jurisdiction had existed, or a
combination of such offenses ....
118 U.S.C. § 3142(0(1)(B) (2003).
25.
18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(B) (2003).
26.
18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(C) (2003).
27.
18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(D) (2003).
28.
Section 3142 (f)
(2) provides two additional types of cases for which a court may order a detention hearing:
Upon motion of the attorney for the Government or upon the judicial officer's own
motion, in a case that involves(A) a serious risk that such person will flee; or
(B) a serious risk that such person will obstruct or attempt to obstruct justice, or
threaten, injure, or intimidate, or attempt to threaten, injure, or intimidate, a prospective witness orjuror.
18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (2) (B) (2003).
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where there is a serious risk of obstruction of justice or tampering
9 Absent one of the six
with a prospective witness or juror."
foregoing statutory circumstances, courts and prosecutors are
powerless to even consider the issue of pretrial detention."
Accordingly, a court's interpretation of the applicability of those
categories is critical to whether pretrial detention can even be
considered.
In the context of evaluating safety-based detention in unlawful
possession of firearms cases, courts have focused on just one of the
six statutory categories, namely whether the unlawful firearms possession offense falls within the Bail Reform Act's definition of a
"crime of violence."3 The Act's definition for "crime of violence"
includes three different types of offenses:
*
Any "offense that has as an element of the offense
the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force3 2 against the person or property of
another;"

*

"[A] ny other offense that is a felony and that, by its
nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force
against the person or property of another may be
used in the course of committing the offense;"'33 or
*
Any sexual exploitation felony falling within three
chapters of Title 18, United States Code, namely
chapters 109A, 110, or 117.34
Because a defendant's unlawful possession of a firearm involves
only the risk of violence, courts considering detention of such defendants generally discuss only the second statutory definition
listed above, relating to the "substantial risk" of physical force .s
29.
Id.
30.
See, e.g., United States v. Singleton, 182 E3d 7, 9 (D.C. Cir. 1999) ("Detention until
trial is relatively difficult to impose. First, a judicial officer must find one of six circumstances triggering a detention hearing.... Absent one of these circumstances, detention is
not an option." (internal citations omitted)).
31.
See, e.g., United States v. Plakio, No. 01-40084-01-RDR, 2001 WL 1167305, at *2 (D.
Kan. Sept. 5, 2001) (addressing the detention of a person charged with a violation of Section 922 (g)(1), and focusing on "the issue of whether the crime of felon in possession of a
firearm is a crime of violence under the Bail Reform Act").
32.
18 U.S.C. § 3156(a) (4) (A) (2003).
33.
18 U.S.C. § 3156(a) (4) (B) (2003).
34.
18 U.S.C. § 3156(a) (4) (C) (2003).
35.
See, e.g.,
United States v. Say, 233 F. Supp. 2d 221, 225-26 (D. Mass. 2002) (finding
that simple possession of stolen firearms and conspiracy to possess such stolen firearms were
not crimes of violence because there was not "a substantial risk of violence inherent in the
very nature of the crimes themselves"); United States v. Campbell, 28 E Supp. 2d 805, 808
(W.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding that the felon-in-possession offense is a crime of violence under
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Federal courts have adopted a categorical approach to
determine whether an offense, such as a felon's unlawful
possession of a firearm, falls into a detention eligible class under
the Bail Reform Act. 36 Thus, courts typically look only to the

charged statutory violations and the objective risk of harm from
such a violation in determining if a statutory offense is a "crime of
violence" as a matter of law under the Bail Reform Act. Courts do
not consider the particulars of a crime.37 Indeed, although the
underlying circumstances and facts of a particular crime can be
considered-and, indeed, are crucial-in determining whether
detention is appropriate at a detention hearing, such facts are
generally not considered in assessing whether the charged crime
qualifies as a "crime of violence" for the purpose of triggering a
hearing.3 8

the Bail Reform Act). The Court stated that "[t]he statute does not require actual violence
in the commonly understood sense of that word. Instead, it requires only that the offense be
a felony that, 'by its nature, involves a substantial risk
that physical force' may be used." Id.
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3156(a)(4)(B)) (emphasis in original)).
36.
See, e.g., United States v. Goba, 240 E Supp. 2d 242, 249 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) ("In this
Circuit, a categorical analysis is employed to determine whether an offense constitutes a
'crime of violence.' ").
37.
See United States v. Connolly, No. CRIM. 3:98CR223(RNC), 1999 WL 1995186, at
*5 (D. Conn. Dec. 23, 1999) (utilizing the categorical approach to evaluate whether the
felon-in-possession offense is a crime of violence, and explaining that "[u]nder the
'categorical approach,' a court looks only to the intrinsic nature of the offense as it is
defined by statute and does not consider any of the facts surrounding the particular alleged
offense"). But see United States v. Byrd, 969 E2d 106, 110 (5th Cir. 1992) (looking beyond
the charged offense to determine if the case involved a crime of violence, and stating that "it
is not necessary that the charged offense be a crime of violence; only that the case involve a
crime of violence or any one or more of the § 3142(f) factors. But the proof of a nexus
between the non-violent offense charged and one or more of the six § 3142(f) factors is
crucial.").
38.
See United States v. Chappelle, 51 F. Supp. 2d 703, 704-05 (E.D. Va. 1999) ("And
since '[t]reating all defendants charged with a certain offense in the same manner avoids
the risk of ad hoc justice or arbitrary distinctions' ... the Court also favors the categorical
approach that makes every such charge a 'crime of violence,' as opposed to a case by case
approach that examines the individual facts underlying each charge." (quoting United
States v. Campbell, 28 E Supp. 2d 805, 807 (W.D.N.Y. 1998))). But see Byrd, 969 E2d at 110
(expanding the categorical approach to include analysis of uncharged crimes that had a
nexus to the charged offense).
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FINDING THE ORIGINS OF THE JUDICIAL DISAGREEMENT OVER

WHETHER THE BAIL REFORM ACT PERMITS A DETENTION HEARING
IN CASES INVOLVING FELONS WHO ILLEGALLY POSSESS FIREARMS

There is a significant split among federal district and circuit
courts about whether the Bail Reform Act permits a detention
hearing in cases charging the unlawful possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon.39 The decisions of these courts break into two
camps: those that find that "a substantial risk that physical force...
may" result from a felon's unlawful possession of a gun, 4° and those
that feel that no such "substantial risk" can objectively be tied to a
felon's unlawful firearms possession. 4' The split in the views of
these courts arises not only from the language of the Bail Reform
Act, but also the decisions of courts in two other contexts. In
Stinson v. United States,4 2 the United States Supreme Court addressed whether the federal offense of being a felon in possession
of a firearm constitutes a "crime of violence" for the purpose of
triggering the armed career offender sentencing enhancement
under the United States Sentencing Guidelines.3 Various courts of
appeals have also addressed whether the offense of being a felon in
possession of a firearm qualifies as a "crime of violence" for the

39.
Compare United States v. Dillard, 214 F.3d 88, 97, 104 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that
the crime of possessing a firearm subsequent to a felony conviction fell within the Bail Reform Act's definition of a "crime of violence," thereby allowing for a pretrial detention
hearing), with United States v. Singleton, 182 F.3d 7, 16-17 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (finding that
offense of felon in possession of a firearm was not a "crime of violence" under the provisions
of the Bail Reform Act that would allow for a detention hearing).
40.
See, e.g., DUllard, 214 F.3d at 95 ("We think that among the convicted felons who illegally possess guns, the number who do so by reason of the utility of guns in threatening or
causing violence is significant. We find it difficult to accept the proposition that the risk of
violent use of guns by convicted felons who possess them illegally is not 'substantial.'");
United States v. Floyd, 1998 WL 700158, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 10, 1998) ("The court properly
determined that possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1), is a
crime of violence as that term is used in the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3156(a) (4) (B).").
41.
See, e.g., Singleton, 182 F.3d at 15 ("While felons with guns may as a class be more
likely than non-felons with guns or felons without guns to commit violent acts, nothing inherent in a § 922(g) offense creates a 'substantial risk' of violence warranting pretrial
detention."); United States v. Hardon, 1998 WL 320945, at *1 (6th Cir. June 4, 1998) ("Possession of a firearm and ammunition by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), by
their nature, do not involve such a [substantial] risk [of physical force under the Bail Reform Act].").
42.
508 U.S. 36 (1993).
43.
Id. at 37 (finding, based upon the binding nature of commentary to the United
States Sentencing Guidelines, that "[fiederal courts may not use the felon-in-possession
offense as the predicate crime of violence for purposes of imposing the career offender
provision of USSG § 4Bl.1").
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purpose of serving as a predicate offense under 18 U.S.C. 924(c),
which outlaws using, carrying, or possessing a firearm in connection with a "crime of violence." ' Opinions addressing the "crime of
violence" definition under the Bail Reform Act have discussed
these two classes of decisions in varying degrees.45

III.

TRACING THE SOURCE AND MEANING
OF THE STINsoNDECISION

The dispute in Stinson arose at a sentencing hearing in the Middle District of Florida where a district court followed the
recommendation contained in the presentence report prepared by
the United States Probation Office and sentenced the defendant,
Stinson, under the harsher career offender sentencing provisions
of the United States Sentencing Guidelines.46 The court did so
based on the defendant's conviction for being a felon in possession
of a firearm, which occurred after two prior convictions for crimes
of violence.47 Specifically, the district court construed the unlawful
firearms possession conviction as a "crime of violence" under the
guidelines and applied the longer
sentence provided for under the
4
career offender enhancement. 8
Not surprisingly, Stinson appealed the district court's decision to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.4 9 On
44.
See, e.g., United States v. Canon, 993 F.2d 1439, 1441 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that
"possession of a firearm by a felon is not a 'crime of violence' under § 924(c)"); see also
United States v. Flennory, 145 F.3d 1264, 1268 (11th Cir. 1998) (dictum) (stating that "possession of a firearm is not a 'crime of violence' as that term is used in § 924(c) (3)"),
abrogationrecognized by United States v. Brown, 332 E3d 1341, 1345 n.6 (1 th Cir. 2003). But
see also United States v. Jennings, 195 F.3d 795, 798-99 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that possession of an unregistered pipe bomb constituted a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c) (3) because "there is a 'substantial risk' that possession of this inherently dangerous
weapon would produce violence or property damage").
45.
See, e.g., United States v. Twine, 344 F.3d 987, 988 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that a
Section 922(g) offense was not a "crime of violence" because "we are bound by our holding
in ... Canon"); Singleton, 182 F.3d at 16 (citing both Stinson and Canon and applying the
same "crime of violence" definition used in the sentencing context and in Section 924(c) (3)
to the Bail Reform Act); United States v. Stratton, 2001 WL 527442, at *2 (D. Ariz. 2001)
(distinguishing the context in which the Ninth Circuit issued its decision in Canon, and
finding that a Section 922(g)(1) offense did qualify as a "crime of violence" under the Bail
Reform Act).
46.
Stinson, 508 U.S. at 38.
47.
Id.
48.
Id. at 38-39.
49.
United States v. Stinson, 943 F.2d 1268 (11th Cir. 1991), reh'g denied, 957 E2d 813
(11th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 508 U.S. 36 (1993).
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appeal, Stinson argued that mere possession of a firearm, even by a
prohibited person, does not constitute a "crime of violence." 50 The
Eleventh Circuit, however, clearly thought little of Stinson's argument and wrote a strongly-worded opinion rejecting the
defendant's view." In doing so, the court looked to the language of
the sentencing guidelines,52 case law from similar contexts, including the Bail Reform Act,53 as well as the legislative history of federal
firearms laws.54 In particular, the court focused on two pieces of
persuasive authority: (1) the decision of the United States District
55
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan in United States v. Jones;,
and (2) the legislative history behind the federal firearms offense
codified at Title 18, United States Code, Section 924(e).50
In discussing the Jones decision-a case in which a district court
found that illegal firearm possession by a prior felon was a "crime
of violence" under the Bail Reform Act-the court focused on the
four specific reasons given by the Jones court for its conclusion:
The court in Jones offered four independent justifications for
its conclusion that the offense of weapons possession by a
felon "by its nature" involves a "substantial risk of physical
force": (1) felons are more likely to use firearms in an irresponsible manner; (2) felons are acutely aware that such
activity is illegal, making the act of weapons possession a
knowing disregard for [sic] legal obligations imposed upon
them; (3) felons are more likely to commit crimes, enhancing
the likelihood the weapon will be used in a violent manner;
and (4) illegal weapons possession is an ongoing offense that
is often not ended voluntarily, but only through law enforcement intervention, thus "[t] he character of the crime cannot
be measured
solely as of the moment of discovery and ar57
rest."

On the heels of its consideration of the foregoing factors in
Jones, the Stinson court turned its attention to the legislative history
justifying the criminal punishment of the unlawful possession of
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 1270.
See generally id.
Id. at 1270.
Id. at 1271-72.
Id. at 1272.
651 F. Supp. 1309 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
Stinson, 943 F.2d at 1272.
Id. (quotingJones, 651 F. Supp. at 1310).
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firearms by prohibited persons."' Specifically, the court focused on
the Congressional commentary surrounding the passage of the
Federal Firearms Owners Protection Act of 1986:
We find further support for the conclusion that the offense of
weapons possession by a felon "by its nature" imposes a "serious potential risk of injury" in the legislative history behind 18
U.S.C. § 924(e), which streamlined the categories of persons
unqualified to receive or possess firearms and established a
stiff mandatory minimum punishment. Section 924(e) was included as part of the Federal Firearms Owners Protection Act
of 1986, which relaxed federal rules regarding private sales of
firearms among sportsmen and collectors while simultaneously "enhanc[ing] the ability of law enforcement to fight
violent crime and narcotics trafficking." ...

Introducing the

measure on the floor of the Senate, its sponsor Senator
McClure outlined what he considered unduly aggressive federal enforcement of private weapons sales among collectors
and sportsmen, and concluded, "We need to redirect law enforcement efforts away from what amounts to paperwork
errors and toward willful firearms law violations that will lead to
violent crime; for example, selling stolen guns, or sellingfirearms to
prohibitedpersons."5 9

In light of the court's selection of the foregoing authorities as
support, the Eleventh Circuit's ultimate finding-that possession of
a firearm by a felon should be deemed a "crime of violence"-is
hardly surprising. What may be surprising, however, to those to
those who disagree with the court's ultimate conclusion, is the
strong wording of the court's ultimate conclusion:
Like the legislative body that criminalized weapons possession
by convicted felons, we conclude that defendant's offense of
conviction 'by its nature' imposed a 'serious risk of physical
injury,' whether or not injury results at the exact moment of
arrest or anytime during defendant's ongoing possession of
the firearm. Because this offense always constitutes a 'crime of
violence,' a convicted felon found guilty of firearms possession is automatically subject to sentencing enhancement

58.
59.

Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
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under the career offender provisions of the Sentencing
Guidelines.60
Less than a month after the Eleventh Circuit's decision, the
United States Sentencing Commission amended its commentary to
the guidelines section that was at issue in Stinson.6' The new commentary, which became effective November 1, 1991,62 was directly
contrary to the result in Stinson, as well as the results of decisions by
four other circuit courts that had addressed the same issue.63 Specifically, the Sentencing Commission added language to the
relevant section's commentary stating that "'crime of violence'
does not include the offense of unlawful possession of a firearm by
a felon.""
Following the Sentencing Commission's amendment of its
guidelines, Stinson petitioned for a rehearing of his appeal.6 ' The
Eleventh Circuit, however, was unswayed by the Sentencing
Commission's action.6 6 The court reasoned that case law
overwhelmingly supported the findings expressed in its earlier
opinion, and explained that agency commentary that has not been
passed upon by Congress, does nothing to bind federal courts or
overrule established case authority. Accordingly, the Eleventh
Circuit denied the petition for rehearing.6
Id. at 1272-73.
60.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, 433, at 836 (1991). The Guide61.
lines amend the commentary to section 4B1.2 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, and
state, in relevant part:
The term 'crime of violence' does not include the offense of unlawful possession of a
firearm by a felon. Where the instant offense is the unlawful possession of a firearm
by a felon, the specific offense characteristics of § 2K2.1 (Unlawful Receipt, Possession, and Transportation of Firearms or Ammunition) provide an increase in offense
level if the defendant has one or more prior felony convictions for a crime of violence or controlled substances offense; and, if the defendant is sentenced under the
provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), § 4B1.4 (Armed Career Criminal) will apply.
(amendment effective November 1, 1991).
Id.
Id.
62.
See United States v. Goodman, 914 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Alva63.
rez, 914 F.2d 915 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. O'Neal, 937 E2d 1369 (9th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Williams, 892 E2d 296 (3d Cir. 1989).
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2, cmt. n.1 (1991).
64.

65.
(1993).
66.
67.
68.

United States v. Stinson, 957 F.2d 813, 814 (11th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 508 U.S. 36
Id. at 815.
Id.
Id.

University of MichiganJournalof Law Reform

[VOL. 37:3

Stinson appealed his case to the United States Supreme Court,
which granted certiorari for the limited purpose of determining
whether the Eleventh Circuit erred when it did not accord binding
effect to the commentary of the United States Sentencing Guidelines.6 9 In examining the case, the Court reversed the Eleventh
Circuit and held that the guidelines commentary was binding on
the federal courts. ° Accordingly, the Supreme Court did not specifically address the question of whether, as a matter of law, the
illegal possession of a firearm constitutes a "crime of violence."'"
Indeed, the Court made clear that it was not addressing that issue
when it qualified its opinion by stating that "[w]e recognize that
the exclusion of the felon-in-possession offense from the definition
of 'crime of violence' may not be compelled by the guideline
text."7" Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's decision in Stinson is often discussed as if it actually spoke to that issue, i.e., as if the
Supreme Court had reviewed the Eleventh Circuit's first decision
prior to the Sentencing Guidelines amendment of its commentary.7 3 More often, however, the Stinson decision is discussed in an
effort either to distinguish or draw parallels between the application of the term "crime of violence" in the sentencing and pretrial
detention contexts.74

69.
United States v. Stinson, 508 U.S. 36, 40 (1993) ("The various Courts of Appeals
have taken conflicting positions on the authoritative weight to be accorded to the commentary to the Sentencing Guidelines, so we granted certiorari.").
Id. at 47-48.
70.
71.
According to the opening language of the Court's opinion, the specific issue before the Court was whether the Eleventh Circuit erred when it held that "the commentary to
the Sentencing Guidelines is not binding on the federal courts." Id. at 37-38. The answer to
that issue was summarized when the Court decided that "commentary in the Guidelines
Manual that interprets or explains a guideline is authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that
guideline." Id. at 38.
72.
Id. at 47.
73.
Cf United States v. Newman, 1997 WL 603740, at *1 n.1 (10th Cir. Oct. 1, 1997)
(rejecting a defendant's reliance on Stinson in the Bail Reform Act context, explaining that
"Stinson provides little or no guidance concerning application of the § 3156(a) (4) definition
at issue here"). Moreover, the author has confronted this type of argument a number of
times in addressing the prospective detention of defendants charged with violating 18 U.S.C.
§ 92 2 (g) (1).
74.
See, e.g., Newman, 1997 WL 603740, at *1 n.1 (rejecting the appeal of two defendants who claimed that the Stinson decision should control the question of whether their
unlawful possession of ten pipe bombs, which are considered "firearms" under the law, constituted a "crime of violence" under the Bail Reform Act). The Tenth Circuit expressly found
that the defendants' argument was unpersuasive and noted that "the Court acknowledged
that the gloss placed by the commentary might 'not be compelled by the guideline text.'
Id. (quoting Stinson, 508 U.S. at 47).
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COURTS' INTERPRETATION OF "CRIME OF VIOLENCE"
IN THE CONTEXT OF

18 U.S.C. §

924(C)

(3)

Some of the opinions that have addressed the Bail Reform Act's
"crime of violence" definition in firearms prosecution cases have
discussed how other courts have handled the same definition under Title 18, United States Code, Section 924(c).75 Section 924(c)
makes it unlawful for anyone to use or carry a firearm during or in
relation to a "crime of violence." 6 It also makes it unlawful for anyone to possess a firearm in the furtherance of a "crime of
violence.",7' The definition set forth for "crime of violence" under
Section 924(c) is identical in all78material respects to the definition
set forth in the Bail Reform Act.

Only three courts of appeals have examined whether unlawful
possession of a firearm can constitute a "crime of violence" for the.
purpose of Section 924(c) .7 Two cases have discussed whether the
federal felon-in-possession offense qualifies as a "crime of violence"
80
under Section 924(c), albeit one of those cases did so in dictum.

Another case has looked at whether the unlawful possession of an
unregistered firearm meets the "crime of violence" definition.8 1
Of the two cases that have looked at the felon-in-possession
offense, both have concluded that the offense cannot be used as a
75.
See, e.g., United States v. Lane, 252 E3d 905, 907 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing the treatment of the felon-in-possession offense under the "crime of violence" definition in a pair of
cases addressing 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) offenses) (citing United States v. Flennory, 145 F3d
1264, 1268 (11th Cir. 1998) and United States v. Canon, 993 E2d 1439, 1441 (9th Cir.
1993)); see also, e.g., United States v. Moncrief, 289 F. Supp. 2d 1311 (M.D. Ala. 2003) (examining the Bail Reform Act's "crime of violence" definition against the meanings given to the
same definition in the context of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (3)).
76.
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2003).
77.
Id.
78.
Compare 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (3) (2003) (setting forth a two-pronged "crime of violence" definition identical to the first two prongs of the definition set forth at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3156(a)(4)(B)), with 18 U.S.C. § 3156(a)(4)(B) (2003) (setting forth a three-pronged
"crime of violence" definition for that term as used in the Bail Reform Act).
79.
See United States v. Jennings, 195 F.3d 795, 797-98 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that
possession of an unregistered firearm, specifically a pipe bomb, constituted a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (3) because "there is a 'substantial risk' that possession of
this inherently dangerous weapon would produce violence or property damage"); United
States v. Flennory, 145 F.3d 1264, 1268 (11th Cir. 1998) (dictum) (stating that "possession of
a firearm is not a 'crime of violence' as that term is used in § 924(c) (3)"), abrogation rcognized by United States v. Brown, 332 F.3d 1341, 1345 n.6 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v.
Canon, 993 F.2d 1439, 1441 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that "possession of a firearm by a felon
is not a 'crime of violence' under § 924(c)").
80.
See infra note 83.
81.
SeeJennings, 195 E3d at 797-98.
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predicate "crime of violence" under Section 924(c). 2 Because one
of the these cases reached that conclusion in dictum and was later
overruled on other grounds, 3 only one of the two decisions merits
any discussion. That decision, however, does not provide much to
support meaningful discussion, either. In United States v. Canon,4
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
concluded that "possession of a firearm by a felon is not a 'crime of
violence' under § 924(c)." s5 The court provided almost no analysis
or discussion in reaching this conclusion, aside from relying on the
amendment to the UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL, discussed supra in Stinson, that expressly excluded the
of violence" definition
felon-in-possession offense from the "crime
8 6
offenders."
"career
so-called
to
applicable
The Fifth Circuit came to a somewhat different conclusion in
United States v. Jennings 7 when it concluded that a defendant's possession of unregistered firearms in violation of Title 26, United
States Code, Section 5861 (d) constituted a "crime of violence" under Title 18, United States Code, Section 924(c). 8' The firearms at
issue were, however, not traditional firearms, but pipe bombs that
fell within the National Firearms Act's definition of "firearm" by
virtue of being "destructive device [s] .,,89 The defendant had a traditional firearm, a handgun, with him when he possessed the pipe
bombs. 90 He was charged with possessing that handgun during and
in relation to the "crime of violence" of possessing the pipe
bombs. 9' Because the court easily concluded that the possession of
an unregistered weapon like a pipe bomb fell within the "crime of

82.

See Flennory, 145 F.3d at 1268; Canon, 993 F.2d at 1441.

83.

See Flennory, 145 F.3d at 1268. Although the Flennory case dealt with both a felon-in-

possession charge and a charge under Section 924(c), the court expressly noted that a drug
trafficking felony was the predicate crime under the Section 924(c) count. Id. at 1267-68.
The court further stated that "[t]he plea agreement gave no indication that the violation for
being a felon in possession of a firearm was the predicate offense for the violation of
§ 924(c) (1)." Id. at 1268. Accordingly, the court's comment that "[w]e note also that possession of a firearm by felon is not a 'crime of violence' as that term is used in § 924(c) (3)"
constitutes dictum. Id.
84.
993 F.2d 1439 (9th Cir. 1993).
Id. at 1441.
85.
86.
Id. (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2, cmt n.2 (1991)).
87.
195 F.3d 795 (5th Cir. 1999).

88.
Id. at 797-98.
See id. at 796; 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a),(f) (2003) (defining the terms "firearm" and
89.
"destructive device" under the National Firearms Act).
90.
91.

Jennings, 195 F.3d at 796.
Id.
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violence" definition, it saw no problem with the manner in which
the defendant was charged."
The different treatment of unlawful firearms possession in
Canon and Jennings appears to relate less to the statutes involved
than the facts of each case. In Canon, the government charged a
felon who possessed a firearm both under the felon-in-possession
statute and under Section 924(c) for using or carrying that same
firearm during and in relation to the felon-in-possession offense. 9'
Essentially, the defendant faced multiple charges and additional
punishment for the same gun possession incident, albeit with different legal elements for each of the charged crimes.94 In Jennings,
the facts are markedly different, perhaps explaining the different
result. The defendant possessed a number of pipe bombs and kept
a handgun in his car where some of the pipe bombs were. 95 Accordingly, he was charged with using or carrying his handgun
during and in relation to the "crime of violence" of pipe bomb
possession.96 The act of carrying a gun was distinct from, albeit in
relation to, the act of possessing unlawful destructive devices.
Both Canon and Jennings have been cited or discussed by courts
that have grappled with whether the Bail Reform Act's "crime of
violence" definition encompasses unlawful firearms possession. 9'
Although the context and rationale for those two courts' decisions
are sometimes distinguished in discussing the Bail Reform Act,""
some courts simply accept the findings, at least those in Canon, as
completely dispositive of the issue, regardless of the changed

92.
Id. at 798-99.
93.
United States v. Canon, 993 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1993).
94.
Accordingly, there may not have been a double jeopardy issue under the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S.
299, 304 (1932) (setting forth the test for a multiplicitous indictment in violation of the
Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause); see also U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[NJor shall
any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put injeopardy of life or limb . ..
95. Jennings, 195 F.3d at 796-97.
96.
Id. at 797.
97.
See United States v. Twine, 344 F.3d 987,988 (9th Cir. 2003), petitionforreh 'g en banc
pending, 353 F.3d 690 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Lane, 252 F.3d 905, 907 (7th Cir.
2001); United States v. Moncrief, 289 E Supp. 2d 1311, 1315 (M.D. Ala. 2003).
98.
See, e.g., United States v. Dillard, 214 F.3d 88, 103 n.17 (2d Cir. 2000). The court rejects the defendant-appellant's argument that "by construing the felon-in-possession offense
to be a 'crime of violence' for the purpose of the Bail Reform Act, we illogically compel the
same reading of another statute, 18 U.S.C. § 924." The court further explains that "[g]iven
the different contexts and purposes of the statutes, courts retain ample latitude to interpret
them differently if Congress intended them to have different meanings."
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context." The latter courts simply find, based on Canon, that the
federal felon-in-possession offense should not be viewed as a
"crime of violence" in any context, including the Bail Reform Act
context.'00 In so doing, those courts are merely following Canon's
lead
of bootstrapping a conclusion
regarding
statutory
construction from an amendment to the United States Sentencing
Guidelines Manual. In essence, those courts do exactly what the
United States Supreme Court in Stinson"°" expressly "recognized"
should not be done with respect to the Guidelines' text at issue,
namely "that the exclusion of the felon-in-possession offense from
the definition of 'crime of violence' may not be compelled by the
0 2
guideline text.'

V.

THEJUDICIAL DIVIDE REGARDING THE BAIL REFORM ACT'S
CRIME OF VIOLENCE DEFINITION AFTER STINSON AND CANON

Following the Supreme Court's decision in Stinson and the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Canon, courts have split over whether unlawful
firearms possession should be treated as a "crime of violence" in
pretrial detention decisions under the Bail Reform Act.10 3 The split
appears to have resulted from two things: (1) a perception among
courts that the Bail Reform Act's definition of "crimes of violence"
is ambiguous; and (2) differing views of the significance, if any, of
judicial and administrative interpretations of "crime of violence" in
other contexts.
The split among courts has created two primary groups of opinions. The first and slightly larger number of opinions focuses on
the purpose of the Bail Reform Act and the inherent danger in
99.
See, e.g., Twine, 344 E3d at 988 (finding that "felon in possession of a firearm ... is
not a crime of violence for purposes of the Bail Reform Act" because "we are bound by our
holding in United States v. Canon, 993 F.2d 1439, 1441 (9th Cir. 1993)").
100. Id.
.101.
Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993).
102.
Id. at 47.
103.
Compare, e.g., United States v. Singleton, 182 F.3d 7 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citing Stinson

and finding that the federal felon-in-possession offense does not constitute a crime of violence under the Bail Reform Act), with, e.g., Dillard,214 F.3d at 97 ("'[B]y its nature,' the
offense of illegal gun possession by a person previously convicted of a felony offense (not
including business-regulating offenses), 'involves a substantial risk that physical force ...
may be used in the course of committing the offense."'), and United States v. Floyd, 1998

WL 700158 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 10, 1998) ("The court properly determined that possession. of a
firearm by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), is a crime of violence as that term is
used in the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3156(a) (4) (B).").
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unlawful firearms possession. 14 These opinions find, notwithstanding the different interpretation of the same term in the sentencing
context, that unlawful firearms possession should be viewed categorically as a "crime of violence," thus allowing for consideration of
the detention issue. 5 The second group of opinions takes the contrary view, finding that while unlawful firearms possession may, as a
class of offenses, create a risk of violence, that risk does not constitute the "substantial risk [of] physical force" during the
commission of the offense that is required to constitute a "crime of
violence.' °6 This second class of opinions looks to the interpretation of "crime of violence" in the sentencing context as a source of
persuasive authority for its views."0 7
A. The So-Called "Slim Majority Rule' 0 0 Favoring the Treatment
of Unlawful FirearmsPossession as a "Crime of Violence"
Throughout the case law addressing unlawful firearms
possession as a "crime of violence" under the Bail Reform Act,
references are made to the so-called majority rule favoring
inclusion of such firearms possession crimes as crimes of
104. See, e.g., United States v. Shirley, 189 F. Supp. 2d 966, 968 (W.D. Mo. 2002) ("A majority of other courts to consider the issue have also found that being a felon in possession of
a firearm constitutes a crime of violence under the Bail Reform Act.").
105. See, e.g., United States v. Connolly, No. CRIM. 3:98CR223(RNC), 1999 WL 1995186,
at *7 (D. Conn. Dec. 23, 1999) ("[B]y its nature, the offense [of being a felon in possession
of a firearm] poses a substantial risk that physical force may be used. The court is persuaded
that a substantial risk of physical force exists when a felon unlawfully possesses a firearm
because it is likely that he will use the firearm.").
106. See, e.g., Singleton, 182 F.3d at 15 (finding that a detention hearing was not warranted in a felon-in-possession of a firearm case, explaining that "[w]hile felons with guns
may as a class be more likely than non-felons with guns or felons without guns to commit
violent acts, nothing inherent in a § 922(g) offense creates a 'substantial risk' of violence
warranting pretrial detention"); United States v. Hardon, 1998 WL 320945, at *1 (6th Cir.
June 4, 1998) (holding that possession of a firearm and ammunition by a felon does not
involve such a substantial risk that physical force may be used in the course of committing
the offense).
107. See Singleton, 182 E3d at 15-16 (finding its rejection of the government's detention
argument to be "consistent with the treatment of crimes of violence at sentencing" and explaining that "[i]f § 922(g) violations are not a predicate for lengthening the sentence of
convicted armed recidivists, it would be incongruous to hold that the offense nevertheless
warrants detention of merely accused armed recidivists').
108. United States v. Stratton, No. CR 00-0431 PHX SMM, 2001 WL 527442, at *3 (D.
Ariz. Apr. 24, 2001) (adopting "the rationale as the better-reasoned decision and slim majority
ru/e that the crime of Possession of a Firearm by a Convicted Felon for the purposes of the
Bail Reform Act is a 'crime of violence'" (emphasis added)).
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violence.'09 Due to the impracticality of quantifying the full body of
opinions, published and unpublished, that have made such socalled majority findings, this Article does not seek to establish a
numerical majority one way or the other. Nevertheless, it does
appear that the greater number of opinions on the subject,
including district court opinions, skew in favor of finding that
unlawful firearms possession should be deemed a "crime of
violence." ° When looking only at court of appeals decisions,
however, the numbers turn the other way, with more courts
choosing to exclude unlawful firearms possession from the Bail
Reform Act's "crime of violence" definition."' Accordingly, the
term "majority rule" may be a misnomer.
Although the so-called majority rule is expressed in a number of
cases, it was best expressed by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit in United States v. Dillard.12 In Dillard, the
Second Circuit was confronted with an appeal from a district
court's detention of a defendant charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm under Title 18, United States Code, Section
9
22(g) (1).11 3 The lower court had ordered a detention hearing
based upon a finding that a violation of Section 922(g) (1) qualified as a "crime of violence" under the Bail Reform Act." 4 Based
upon evidence adduced at the detention hearing, the lower court
determined that Dillard was a danger to the community to the degree that "no conditions of release would adequately protect the
community."1 1 5 Dillard was alleged to have answered his door on

109. See, e.g., id.
110. See id.; see also United States v. Dillard, 214 F.3d 88, 97 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating that
"[t]he vast majority of courts that have considered the question have agreed" that the felon
in possession offense falls within the Bail Reform Act's definition of "crime of violence");
United States v. Shirley, 189 F. Supp. 2d 966, 968 (W.D. Mo. 2002) (recognizing that a majority of courts addressing the issue have found that unlawful gun possession by a felon
constitutes a crime of violence).
111. Compare Dullard, 214 F.3d 88, and United States v. Floyd, 1998 WL 700158 (D.C. Cir.
Aug. 10, 1998), with United States v. Twine, 344 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2003), United States v.
Lane, 252 F.3d 905 (7th Cir. 2001), United States v. Singleton, 182 F.3d 7 (D.C. Cir. 1999),
and United States v. Hardon, 1998 WL 320945 (6th Cir. June 4, 1998). See also United States
v. Newman, 1997 WL 603740, at *1 (10th Cir. Oct. 1, 1997) (finding that defendants' unlawful possession of unregistered "firearms" under 26 U.S.C. § 5861 constituted a crime of
violence under the Bail Reform Act, where the firearms were "ten fully functional pipe
bombs").
112. 214 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000).
113. Id. at 90.
114. Id.
115. Id.

SPRING

2004]

Hearingthe Dangerof an Armed Felon

March 24, 1999, and fired "three gun shots" at the unknown individuals who were calling on him. 6
In reviewing the lower court's decision, the Second Circuit first
looked to the felon-in-possession law contained in Section
9 22(g) (1).1 7In doing so, the
court looked not only at the language
of the statute, but also at a related statutory provision that excludes
many types of nonviolent felony crimes from the coverage of the
felon-in-possession statute." 8 The related provision, which is found
at Tide 18, United States Code, Section 921 (a) (20) (A), removes all
"Federal [and] State offenses pertaining to antitrust violations, unfair trade practices, restraints of trade, or other similar offenses
relating to the regulation of business practices" from the coverage
of Section 9 22 (g) (1)'s prohibition against felons possessing firearms."9 The Dillard court noted that "[b]y this definition, Congress
excluded many non-violent felonies from the scope of the prohibition" against felons possessing firearms. 2
After reviewing the statute under which Dillard was charged, the
court proceeded to analyze the detention provisions of the Bail
Reform Act, focusing on the Act's definition of and application to
"crime [s] of violence.' 2' In examining the Act's use of the term

"crime of violence," the court explained that "the conventional
meaning of that term does not govern the question." 122 Rather, the

court explained that "[t]he statute uses that phrase as a term of art
and provides ... a special definition that extends substantially
3
beyond the conventional meaning of 'crime of violence.' ,12
In

particular, the court noted that Section 3156(a)(4) of the Bail
Reform Act contains both a conventional definition of "crime of
violence," e.g., crimes involving actual or threatened use of force,
and a definition that "is clearly intended to cast a wider net.""14 This

"wider net" is found at Section 3156(a) (4) (B), which addresses
felony crimes that "by [their] nature, involve[] a substantial risk that
physical force ... may be used in the course of committing the

offense." 25 According to the Dillard court, this "wider net" clause
"speaks to offenses that give rise to a possibility, rather than a
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id.
Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2003).
Id.; seealso 18 U.S.C. § 921(a) (20) (A) (2003).
18 U.S.C. § 921(a) (20) (A) (2003).
Dillard, 214 F.3d at 90.
Id. at 91 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(A) (2003)).
Id.
Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3156(a) (4) (2003)).
Id. at92.
18 U.S.C. § 3156(a) (4) (B) (2003).
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certainty, that force may be used....
Force need not be a necessary
26
concomitant to the offense.',
Although Dillard's use of force-i.e., his discharging his gunduring the commission of his crime made it unnecessary for the
court to decide whether the "crime of violence" determination
needed to be made on a case-by-case basis or a categorical basis
due to the nature of the offense, the court in dictum endorsed the
categorical approach. Specifically, the court "assume [d], without
deciding, ... that the use or risk of violence must result from the
categorical nature of the offense and that the statute would not be
satisfied where a defendant used violence in the commission of an
offense whose nature
ordinarily does not give rise to a substantial
2 7
violence."
of
risk
In seeking to apply the Bail Reform Act to the felon-inpossession charge in Dillard, the court looked to the language of
the Act, 2 " common-sense conclusions about felons who possess
guns, 2 9 and the legislative history behind both the Bail Reform
Act "' and the Gun Control Act of 1968.13 In doing so, the court
easily concluded that: "if the words of the [Bail Reform] Act carry
their normal meanings, possession of a gun by its nature gives rise
to a risk of its use in violence; if that violent use occurs, it will occur
in the course of the possession; if the possession is a criminal offense, the violent use will occur in the course of the offense of
possession."' 32 Accordingly, the court focused its attention on the
more narrow and difficult question of "whether the risk of violent
use [of an unlawfully possessed] firearm by a convicted felon is
'substantial.' "'3 With the question narrowly focused, the Dillard
court proceeded to explain that it felt that "the most logical interpretation" of the Bail Reform Act "leads to the conclusion that the
risk" of violence stemming from a felon's unlawful firearm possession "is substantial.', 3 4 The court then detailed the basis for its
conclusion, starting first with certain inferences it drew from the
nature of the felon-in-possession offense:
126. DUllard, 214 F.3d at 92.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 90-95.
129. Id. at 95 ("We think that among the convicted felons who illegally possess guns, the
number who do so by reason of the utility of guns in threatening or causing violence is significant.").
130. Id. at 95-99.
131. Id.at 95-96.
132. Id. at 94.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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The risk of violent use posed by a convicted felon's possession
of firearms is significant. The category of persons under consideration is limited to those who (a) have already been
convicted of one felony (not including crimes of business
regulation) and (b) have been charged with a second. Given
the further fact that the issue arises only with respect to persons possessing a gun notwithstanding the fact the illegality of
doing so, we think the risk of violent use arising from the nature of the offense cannot be regarded as insubstantial. For
the risk to be "substantial," it is certainly not necessary that all
or even most such illegal possessions create the risk of violence. It is sufficient that the risk be material, important, or
significant. We think that among the convicted felons who illegally possess guns, the number who do so by reason of the
utility of guns in threatening or causing violence is significant.
We find it difficult to accept the proposition that the risk of
violent use of guns by convicted felons who possess them illegally is not "substantial."'35
The Dillardcourt did not, however, stop with its conclusion. The
court went further to consider the possibility that the Bail Reform
Act of 1984 was "open to dispute" with respect to the scope of the
"crime of violence" definition. Accordingly, the court proceeded
to look to the primary purpose expressed in the legislative history
of the Act."3 7 That purpose, as explained by the court and discussed
supra, was the creation of a mechanism by which courts could consider pretrial detention of defendants based on danger to the
community.'3 As the court explained: "Prior to the 1984 Act the law
previously in effect (the Bail Reform Act of 1966) made no provision
for detention by reason of the defendant's dangerousness to protect
the community." 9 By contrast, "[o]ne of the major reforms of the
new statute was the provision for pretrial detention of numerous
categories of dangerous defendants." 140 The court then proceeded to

cite the Senate Report that accompanied passage of the Act, which
detailed serious concerns regarding the prior law's failure to

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 94-95.
Id. at95.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 95.
Id.
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account for danger to the community in detention decisions. 4' In
sum, the court stated that the Senate Report "suggested that the
Act arose from a 'broad base of support for giving judges the authority to weigh risks to community safety in pretrial release
decisions.' ,,042
The court did not limit its legislative history analysis to the legislative intent behind the Bail Reform Act, but also looked to the
"[t]he legislative history of the felon-in-possession provision"
which, according to the court, "confirms that Congress regarded
convicted felons as persons 'who pose serious risks of... danger to
the community." 43 The court quoted the sponsor of the felon-in44

possession prohibition, Senator Russell Long (D) of Louisiana,
who stated that the classes of prohibited persons under his proposed statute "[s]tated simply, ... may not be45trusted to possess a
firearm without becoming a threat to society."

After its tour of legislative history, the court stood by its initial
conclusion.'4 The court reasoned that including felon-inpossession violations within the meaning of "crime of violence"
would be in accord with the language and intent of the Bail Reform Act, whereas a contrary conclusion "would do serious harm to
the Act's objectives.' ' 147 The court's reasoning was that including

unlawful firearms possession within the Act's definition of "crime
of violence" did nothing more than allow for a detention hearing
at which a judge would be able to evaluate evidence of a defendant's dangerousness. 4 8 This reasoning resembled the primary
purpose behind the Bail Reform Act of 1984, which was to give
judges greater flexibility to consider dangerousness in detention
determinations.149

Finally, the Dillardcourt bolstered its position by pointing to the
fact that the "vast majority of courts that have considered the question have agreed with th[e] interpretation" expressed in the Dillard

141.

Id. (citing S. REP. No. 98-225, at 5 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182,

3188).
142.

Id. (quoting S. ReP.

No. 98-225, at 5 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182,

3188).
143.

Id. (citation to internal quotation omitted in original).

144.

See Official Senate Biographical Information for Senator Russell B. Long (on file

with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
145. 114 CONG. REC. 14,773 (1968).
146. DiUard,214 F.3d at 97.

147.
148.

Id. at 96.
Id. at 96-97.

149.

Id.
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decision. 50 In doing so, the court cited a contrary panel opinion
issued by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, and went to great pains-including six pages of
analysis-to challenge and reject the reasoning of that opinion. 5

B. The So-Called "Minority View' 52 of Case Law Denying a Detention
Hearingin Unlawful Firearms Possession Cases

Standing in stark contrast to the opinions in Dillard and the
other, so-called "majority view" cases are opinions that have denied
a detention hearing based on the view that a convicted felon's possession of a firearm does not qualify as a "crime of violence" under
the Bail Reform Act. 55 As with the "majority view" case law, the socalled "minority view" is anchored by a federal appellate panel decision, albeit one from a divided Court of Appeals. 54
150. Id. at 97 (citing, with approval, United States v. Spry, 76 F. Supp. 2d 719, 720-22
(S.D. W.Va. 1999); United States v. Kirkland, No. CRIM. A. 99-143, 1999 WL 329702, at *2*3 (E.D. La. May 21, 1999); United States v. Campbell, 28 F. Supp. 2d 805, 808-10 (W.D.N.Y.
1998); United States v. Floyd, 11 E Supp. 2d 39, 40 (D.D.C. 1998), affd, 1998 WL 700158
(D.C. Cir. Aug. 10, 1998); United States v. Hardon, 6 F. Supp. 2d 673, 676 (W.D. Mich.
1998), rev'd, 1998 WL 320945 (6th Cir. (Mich.) June 4, 1998); United States v. Butler, 165
ER.D. 68, 71-72 (N.D. Ohio 1996); United States v. Washington, 907 F. Supp. 476, 485
(D.D.C. 1995); United States v. Trammel, 922 F. Supp. 527, 530-31 (N.D. Okla. 1995);
United States v. Sloan, 820 F. Supp. 1133, 1138-41 (S.D. Ind. 1993); United States v. Aiken,
775 F. Supp. 855, 856-57 (D. Md. 1991); United States v. Phillips, 732 F. Supp. 255, 262-63
(D. Mass. 1990); United States v. Johnson, 704 F. Supp. 1398, 1399-1401 (E.D. Mich. 1988);
and citing, with disapproval, United States v. Singleton, 182 F.3d at 7 (D.C. Cir. 1999);
United States v. Robinson, 27 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1118-19 (S.D. Ind. 1998); United States v.
Gloster, 969 F. Supp. 92,98 (D.D.C. 1997); United States v. Powell, 813 F. Supp. 903, 909 (D.
Mass. 1992); United States v. Whitford, No. 92-73-J, 1992 WL 188815, at *3-*4 (D. Mass. July
27, 1992)).
151. Id. at 97-104 (distinguishing United States v. Singleton, 182 F3d 7 (D.C. Cir.
1999)).
152. United States v. Stratton, No. CR 00-0431 PHX SMM, 2001 WL 527442, at *3 (D.
Ariz. Apr. 24, 2001) (characterizing as the "minority view" the view held in Singleton, as well
as in other cases, that unlawful firearms possession is not a 'crime of violence' under the Bail
Reform Act).
153. See, e.g.,
United States v.Twine, 344 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2003); Singleton, 182 F.3d at
7; United States v. Hardon, 1998 WL 320945 (6th Cir. June 4, 1998); United States v.Collins,
No. CRIM. A. 02-10152-RWZ, 2002 WL 31027433 (D. Mass. Sept. 11, 2002); United States v.
Silva, 133 F Supp. 2d 104 (D. Mass. 2001); United States v. Plakio, No. 01-40084-01-RDR,
2001 WL 1167305 (D.Kan. Sept.5, 2001).
154. Compare Singleton, 182 F.3d at 7, 14-17 (finding that a detention hearing was not
appropriate based upon danger to the community in a case involving a charge of a felon's
unlawful possession of a firearm, basing itsdecision upon the view that the felon-inpossession offense is not a "crime of violence" within the meaning of the Bail Reform Act),
with United States v. Floyd, 1998 WL 700158, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 10, 1998) (finding that
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In 1999, in United States v. Singleton, a panel of the United States

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit addressed the
question of whether a safety-based detention hearing could be held
for a felon charged with unlawfully possessing a firearm. 155 Despite
a contrary opinion by another panel of the District of Columbia
Circuit less than one year earlier, 56 the panel found as a matter of
law that a detention hearing could not be conducted because the
felon-in-possession statute did not, in its view, constitute a "crime of
violence" under the Bail Reform Act.' 57 In making its decision, the

Singleton court focused upon three chief arguments: (1) the perceived plain meaning of the Bail Reform Act and its "crime of
violence" definition;'58 (2) the narrow meaning assigned to the
term "crime of violence" by the United States Sentencing Commission and as passed upon by the Supreme Court in Stinson;159 and
(3) an implied injustice in considering safety-based detention of a
felon-in-possession of a firearm due to the constitutional presumption of innocence.' 6°
Looking first to the Singleton court's analysis of the perceived
plain meaning of the Bail Reform Act, the court's announced
analysis of the "plain meaning of the statute" does not start with
the statute itself, as a plain meaning analysis would suggest, but
with a series of excerpted quotes from the legislative history of the
statute.' 6' Indeed, before the court even began to probe the statutory language, the court made references to "[i]nterpretive
uncertainty,'

62

"Congressional intent,"' 63 ambiguity,'64 and "the rule

of lenity."' 65 Accordingly, the Singleton court appears to have begun
"the [lower] court properly determined that possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), is a crime of violence as that term is used in the Bail Reform Act, 18
U.S.C. § 3156(a) (4) (B)").
155. Singleton, 182 F.3d at 7.
156. See Floyd, 1998 WL 700158.
157. Singleton, 182 E3d at 16-17.
158. Id. at 13,15.
159. Id.at 15-16.
160. Id. at 13, 15, 16 (referring to the presumption of innocence on at least four occasions).
161. Id. at 13 (quoting, in part, S. REP. No. 98-225, at 6 (1984)).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.at 13 n.12.
165. Id. The "rule of lenity" isa rule of statutory construction concerning ambiguous
penal statutes. Under that rule, "where there is ambiguity in a criminal statute, doubts are
resolved in favor of the defendant." United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971). The rule
"applies only when, after consulting traditional canons of statutory construction, we are left
with an ambiguous statute." United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 17 (1994). The Supreme
Court has explained that "[t]he rule of lenity is not invoked by a grammatical possibility. It
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its purported plain meaning analysis with a discussion of legislative
history and textual uncertainty. With such a start, a decision premised upon a statute's plain meaning appears to be of dubious
.
ment. 166
When the Singleton court reached the plain meaning question in
earnest, it focused upon a portion of the statutory language at issue, namely the latter portion of the alternative "crime of violence"
definition that includes any offense that, "by its nature, involves a
substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of
another may be used in the course of committing the offense."07 In
doing so, the court focused on what it called "the nexus requirement," which mandates that the prospect of force arise in the
course of committing the charged offense.'9 The court then rejected the government's assertion that "in the course of
committing the offense" simply meant during the offense. 69 The
court explained its rejection of the government's assertion by stating, without support, that "the phrase 'in the course of
committing' indicates that some aspect of the charged offense
must create the risk of violence in order to itself qualify as a crime
of violence." 7 ° In support of its view, the court then asserted a
claim that both lacks support and conflicts with the statutory language under analysis: "Absent a direct relationship between the
offense and a risk of violence, the possibility of violence is not a
basis for pretrial detention on a charge that on its face does not
involve violence as an element." 7' The court claimed that such a
direct relationship could be seen in a crime suchas burglary, which
the court asserted would have such a "direct relationship," based
upon the "actions of the burglar in committing the crime itself,

does not apply if the ambiguous reading relied on is an implausible reading of the congressional purpose." Caron v. United States, 524 U.S. 308, 316 (1998).
166. After all, even court decisions utilizing intent-based and holistic approaches to
statutory interpretation first begin their analyses by looking to the language of the statute.
See, e.g., Dole v. United Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26, 35 (1990) (addressing a "pure
question of statutory construction" and, in doing so, explaining that "[tlhe 'starting point is
the language of the statute"' (quoting Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 5

(1985))).
167. Singleton, 182 E3d at 14; 18 U.S.C. § 3156(a) (4) (B) (2003).
168. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3156(a) (4) (B) (2003)).
169. Id. The court explains that "the government construes 'in the course of' as purely
a temporal restraint." Id. Then, the court rejects the government's construction: "While
nimble, this construction fails to respect the words and context of§ 3156." Id.
170. "Id.
171. Id.
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and the likely consequences
that would ensue upon intervention of
172
another person.

Notwithstanding the unequivocal certainty of the court's nexus
analysis, described above, the analysis is wrong. As for the court's
suggestion that the prospect of physical force must bear a "direct
relationship" and "arise[] from" the charged offense, the court
cited no authority aside from a general and unexplained reference
to "the words and context of § 3156.' 13 The reality, however, is that
the words of Section 3156 belie the court's claim, including its use
of the crime of burglary as a purported prime example of its
reasoning. As noted supra, Section 3156(a) (4) contains three
alternative definitions for "crime of violence" under the Bail
Reform Act. 7 4 Although the Singleton court was ostensibly analyzing
the coverage of the second of the definitions contained in Section
3156(a) (4) (B), the court's discussion revealed an understanding of
the law that was more akin to the statute's first definition,
contained in Section 3156(a) (4) (A).1 71 It is the first definition that

addresses crimes with a "direct relationship" to the use of force,
insofar as it covers any "offense that has an element of the offense
the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against
the person or property of another."'76 It is this first definition that
appears to be in accord with the Singleton court's concerns about a
direct nexus between the use of force and the charged offense.
After all, this first definition clearly covers the court's example of
the crime of burglary, which, at least at common law, requires a
physical exertion of force, i.e., a breaking, prior to unlawful entry
into the dwelling of another.177 Accordingly, burglary constitutes an
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 31-35.
175. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3156(a)(4)(A) (2003) (defining the term "crime of violence"
to apply to any "offense that has an element of the offense the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another"), with 18 U.S.C.
§ 3156(a)(4)(B) (2003) (including within the same "crime of violence" definition "any
other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical
force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing
the offense").
176. 18 U.S.C. § 3156(a) (4) (A) (2003).
177. See, e.g., 13 AM. JUR. 2D Burglary § 1 (WESTLAW through May 2003) ("Observation: Burglary consists of unlawful breaking and entering, with the intent to commit a crime
once entry has been gained."); see also State v. Berkey, 630 A.2d 855, 856 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Law
Div. 1993) ("The core of the common law concept of burglary was the breaking and entry
into a dwelling at night with the intent to commit a felony therein."); CHARLES E. TORCIA,
WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 326, at 186 (14th ed. 1980) ("At common law, burglary is
the breaking and entering of the dwelling house of another, at night, with the intent to
commit a felony therein.").
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offense bearing an element of "the use ... of physical force against

the... property of another."'7
The statute's second definition, which is intended to be
broader than the narrow, offense element-based definition contained at Section 3156(a) (4) (A), does not contain any of the
words or concepts, such as "direct relationship" v9 . or "arises
from," 8 that the Singleton court attributes to the definition.181
Similarly, the second definition does not contain any reference to
force being a necessary element of the charged offense. 8 2 Rather,
the second definition, by its own terms, is intended to go beyond
the element-based definition to cover "any other offense that is a
felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that
physical force against the person or property of another may be
used in the course of committing the offense." 83 Although the
Singleton court dismissed out of hand the government's assertion
that the phrase "in the course of' merely references a temporal
relationship between the commission of the charged offense and
the prospect of violence, 184 it did so without explaining why the
phrase could not assume the temporal meaning that is generally
assigned to it in dictionaries and elsewhere. s5
To bolster its conclusion that felons in possession of firearms
do not create a substantial risk of force or violence, the Singleton
court concluded that "the relationship between possession and
use of a firearm is sufficiently attenuated that possession alone
does not create a 'substantial risk' of use[,]" even if the possession is by a convicted felon. 6 The court supported its conclusion
by explaining that "not all felons are potentially more violent
than non-felons," citing examples of felonies involving "economic
178.

18 U.S.C. § 3156(a) (4) (A) (2003).

179.
180.

United States v. Singleton, 182 F.3d 7, 14 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
Id.

181. 18 U.S.C. § 3156(a) (4) (B) (2003) (defining "crime of violence" to include, in addition to crimes with force as an element, "any other offense that is a felony and that, by its
nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense").

182.
183.

Id.
Id.

184.

Singleton, 182 F.3d at 14.

185. See, e.g., THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 305
(New college ed. 1976) (defining the word "course" as: "Movement in time; duration: in the
course of a year." (emphasis added)); WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN
LANGUAGE 326 (2d college ed. 1972) ("-in the course of in the progress or process of; during'
(emphasis added)); see also United States v. Dillard, 214 F.3d 88, 93-94 (2d Cir. 2000) (explaining the Bail Reform Act's requirement that the risk of force occur "in the course of"
the charged offense by using the term "during").
186. Singleton, 182 F.3d at 14-15.
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Indeed, in supporting its

claim, the Singleton court went so far as to suggest that the distinction between "violent and non-violent felonies ...

is irrelevant in

§ 922(g) [felon-in-possession] cases [,] ', 8 8 a statement that is overstated in light of the federal statutory exception for certain
nonviolent felonies, including "antitrust violations, unfair trade
practices, restraints of trade, [and] other similar offenses relating
to the regulation of business practices." 9
In addition to misstating the scope of Section 922(g) (1)'s applicability, the Singleton court stated, without any support, that the
policy considerations behind the federal prohibition on felons'
possession of guns "differ substantially from those in favor of pretrial detention of people who are presumed innocent."'90 In
making this statement, the court failed to explain how Congressional concern about felons committing violent acts with firearms
differs from Congressional concerns about violent acts committed
by individuals awaiting trial on pretrial release. The court also
failed to explain how concerns about a defendant's criminal history, parole status, and experience with the penal system are
relevant under the Bail Reform Act for detention purposes, yet
are of minimal significance, at least according to the Singleton
court, when that same criminal history is factored into the underlying charge as a predicate element.' 9'
Whereas the Singleton court failed to account for key aspects of
the Bail Reform and Gun Control Acts, the court went out of its
way to demonstrate the consistency of its approach with the
United States Sentencing Guidelines and the United States Supreme Court's decision in Stinson v. United States.'92 As
demonstrated above, however, the decision in Stinson does not
187. Id.at 15.
188. Id.
189. 18 U.S.C. § 921 (a) (20) (2003) (excluding the offenses listed above from the statutory definition of "crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year," as
that term is used in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1), and also excluding "any State offense classified by
the laws of the State as a misdemeanor and punishable by a term of imprisonment of two
years or less").
190. Singleton, 182 F.3d at 15.
191. Cf 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (3),(4) (2003) (listing, among the factors to be considered
by the court "in determining whether there are conditions of release that will reasonably
assure.., the safety of any other person and the community" such factors as "past conduct,"
"criminal history," and "whether, at the time of the current offense or arrest, the person was
on probation, on parole, or on other release pending trial, sentencing, appeal, or completion of a sentence for an offense under Federal, State, or local law").
192. Singleton, 182 F.3d at 15-16 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2
cmt. 1 (1998); Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 47 (1993)).
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speak to the underlying issue of whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is
a "crime of violence."'9 3 That decision addresses only an agency
law question regarding the binding effect of a regulation by the
United States Sentencing Commission in the sentencing context. 194 In the specific context under consideration in Stinson, the
Sentencing Commission determined that the federal felon-inpossession offense should not be regarded as a "crime of violence" sufficient to trigger mandatory sentencing enhancements
under the Guidelines.' 95 The Singleton court regarded the Sentencing Commission's decision as significant insofar as "the
overlap between bail and sentencing is striking, at least in the
present context."

96

The court then pointed to the nature of in-

formation known at sentencing rather than at the stage where
pretrial detention is being considered.' 97 What the court did not
address, however, was the nature and effect of classifying the
felon-in-possession offense as a "crime of violence" in the sentencing as opposed to the pretrial detention context.
In the sentencing context, classification of an offense as a
"crime of violence" often means the imposition of a significantly
higher imprisonment sentence, with limited discretion for the
court to depart downward.'98 In Title 28, United States Code, Section 994(h), Congress mandated that the United States
Sentencing Guidelines "specify a sentence to a term of imprisonment at or near the maximum term" in cases where repeat
offenders are convicted of a "crime of violence."'" Such stiff sentences are provided for at Section 4B1.1 of the U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL, which sets forth enhanced sentences for socalled "Career Offender[s] .
Consequently, the classification of
an offense as a "crime of violence" can generate a severe sentence.
The consequences of a similar classification in the pretrial detention context are very different. Such a classification at the
193.

See also supra text accompanying notes 71-75.

194.

Stinson, 508 U.S. at 38 ("We decide that commentary in the Guidelines Manual that

interprets or explains a guideline is authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or a
federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of that guideline.").
195.

Id.; see also supra note 61.

196.
197.
198.

Singleton, 182 F.3d at 16.
Id.
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES

MANUAL

§ 4Bl

(setting forth enhanced penal-

ties for "Career Offender[s]" who have committed "a crime of violence" or "a controlled
substance offense").

199.

28 U.S.C. § 994(h) (2003).

200.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

§ 4B1.1 (2002).
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detention stage would mean nothing more than that a detention
hearing would need to be held.0 1 The issue of detention would
then be left to the court's discretion, subject to the Government
proving by clear and convincing evidence that defendant poses a
danger to the community. 0 2 Consequently, the so-called "overlap"
between the two contexts is "striking" only for the entirely different nature of the two contexts.
The Singleton court's discussion is, however, "striking" for another reason: a gap in its analysis. When the court evaluated the
Sentencing Commission's exclusion of firearms possession offenses from the "crime of violence" definition under the "Career
Offender" guidelines, the court failed to mention that there is
now very little significance to the classification of such possession
as a "crime of violence" under Section 4B1.1. Indeed, at the time
of both the Stinson and Singleton decisions, there was little significance to such a classification, except as to crimes committed
before November 1, 1991. On that date, the sentencing guidelines were amended to specify enhanced sentencing levels for
unlawful firearms possession by certain recidivist offenders.0 3
Through that amendment, the guideline penalties for unlawful
firearms possession for recidivist criminals were rendered the
same as those for "Career Offender[s]" under the guidelines.2 4
201. See United States v. Dillard, 214 F.3d 88, 96 (2d Cir. 2000) ("The conclusion that the
felon-in-possession offense is within the definition of crime of violence does not cause the defendant's detention. It does no more than cause a hearing to consider whether the defendant is
in fact dangerous (or likely to flee)."); see also United States v. Cruickshank, 150 E Supp. 2d 1112,
1115 (D. Colo.2001) (" [A] violation of § 922(g)(1) is a crime of violence and, therefore, under
18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (1) (A), a detention hearing is mandated.").
202. United States v. Stratton, No. CR 00-0431 PHX SMM CR 01-0152 PHX SSM, 2001 WL
527442, at *3 (D. Ariz. Apr. 24, 2001) (explaining that, if the term "crime of violence" is construed to include unlawful firearms possession, "the Court can then proceed with a detention
hearing, requiring the Government to prove on a case-by-case basis by a clear and convincing
standard whether the particular person before it is a danger to the community or a particular
individual"); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3142(0 (2003) ("The facts the judicial officer uses to support a
finding under subsection (e) that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably
assure the safety of any other person and the community shall be supported by clear and convincing evidence.").
203.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES

MANUAL

app. C, amendment 374 (2002) (deleting the

prior version of Section 2K2.1, which set forth penalties for unlawful firearms possession, and
adding a new version of that section that "revise [d] the offense levels and characteristics to more
adequately reflect the seriousness of such offenses, including enhancements for defendants
previously convicted of felony crimes of violence or controlled substances offenses .... The effective date of this amendment is November 1, 1991.").
204. Compare U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.1 (a) (2) (2002) (providing for
an offense level of "24, if defendant committed any part of the instant offense subsequent to
sustaining at least two felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance
offense"), with U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1 (2002) (assigning an offense level
of "24" for crimes carrying a ten-year maximum sentence and for cases in which a person is
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Consequently, the Singleton court was incorrect when it stated that
Section "922(g) violation[s] are not a predicate for lengthening
To the conthe sentence of convicted armed recidivists....
trary, the sentencing guidelines expressly provide for lengthening
the sentence of convicted armed recidivists who unlawfully possess guns in violation of Section 922(g).2

°6

The guidelines have

provided for such longer sentences since November 1991, nearly
eight years before the Singleton decision.
Despite the foregoing analytical flaws, it is clear from the Singleton court's reference to the United States Sentencing Guidelines
that the court was seeking validation of its views by analogy. It is
telling, however, that the court did not seek validation by looking
to the Bureau of Prison's treatment and classification of felons
who possess firearms. Like the United States Sentencing Commission, the federal Bureau of Prisons is an agency charged with the
duty of promulgating interpretive regulations that affect federal
criminal defendants. 20 7 Whereas the Sentencing Commission
promulgates regulations affecting how a defendant should be
sentenced, the Bureau of Prisons promulgates regulations affecting how a defendant is to be classified for the execution of his or
her sentence. °" In contrast to the United States Sentencing
Commission, however, the Bureau of Prisons has concluded that
the federal felon in possession offense should be regarded as a
"crime of violence" for prisoner classification purposes.2 0 9 The

sentenced for a "crime of violence" committed after his eighteenth birthday and "has at least two
prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense"). See also
18 U.S.C. § 924(a) (2) (2003) (setting forth a ten-year maximum sentence for unlawful firearms
possession by a prohibited person in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)).
205. United States v. Singleton, 182 E3d 7, 16 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
206. SeeFEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.1 (a) (2) (2002).
207. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 4041-42 (2003) (providing statutory authority for Bureau of Prisons);
see also 5 U.S.C. § 301 (2003) (establishing the authority for heads of executive departments to
"prescribe regulations for the government of his department, the conduct of its employees, the
distribution and performance of its business, and the custody, use, and preservation of its records, papers, and property").
208. See, e.g, 18 U.S.C. § 3261 (b) (2003) (entrusting the Bureau of Prisons with the authority to designate the placement of individual prisoners to facilities "that the Bureau determines to
be appropriate and suitable").
209. See generally Cook v. Wiley, 208 E3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2000) (finding that the Bureau of
Prisons reasonably interpreted a statute allowing for the early release of defendants who complete residential drug treatment following conviction for a "nonviolent offense," although
Bureau-promulgated regulation concluded that unlawful possession of a firearm, including such
possession by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1), constituted a "crime of
violence" so as to exclude such offenses from eligibility for early release); Sutherland v. Flemming, 2000 WL 1174566 (10th Cir. Aug. 18, 2000). See also 28 C.F.R § 550.58(a) (1)(vi) (B)
(2002) (excluding any inmate "whose current offense is a felony... [t]hat involved the carrying,
possession, or use of a firearm or other dangerous weapon or explosives" from the coverage of a
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Bureau of Prisons' classification decision is not mentioned in the
Singleton decision.21 °

Finally, the Singleton court's repeated references to the presumption of innocence in its decision reveal a degree of discomfort with
the concept of pretrial detention.' After all, why would a court
find it necessary to mention the presumption of innocence numerous times in a purely legal analysis of the Bail Reform Act,
when the Act makes clear in its language that none of its pretrial
detention provisions "shall be construed as modifying or limiting
the presumption of innocence.,

21

2

Under the Bail Reform Act, the

question of pretrial detention is considered independent of, and
without prejudice to, a defendant's constitutional presumption of
innocence, whether the defendant is a terrorist, an armed bank
robber, a kidnapper, or a felon-in-possession of a gun.2

Surely the

Singleton panel would not have opposed holding a detention hearing for an accused terrorist, armed robber, or kidnapper based
upon generic, implied concerns about treading on the presumption of innocence? In the final analysis, it appears that the panel
included references to the presumption of innocence to buoy its
conclusion, which, as shown above, as well as in Dillard and elsewhere,214 stands on a shaky foundation.

pretrial release program for those convicted of a "nonviolent offense"); cf. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3621 (e) (2) (B) (2003) (setting forth statutory authority for a release program for those convicted of a "nonviolent offense"); Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 244 (2001) (approving the Bureau
of Prisons's exclusion under 18 U.S.C. § 3621 (e) (2) (B) (2003) of those who possessed a firearm
in connection with a nonviolent offense, finding that it was reasonable to conclude "that an
inmate's prior involvement with firearms, in connection with the commission of a felony, suggests his readiness to resort to life-endangering violence").
210. See generally Singleton, 182 F.3d at 7 (failing to mention the Bureau of Prisons's classification decision).
211. The Singleton opinion mentions the presumption of innocence in at least four locations in the opinion. I& at 13, 15, 16.
212. 18U.S.C. §3142(j) (2003).
213. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (2003).
214. See, e.g., United States v. Shirley, 189 E Supp. 2d 966, 969 (W.D. Mo. 2002) (stating that
"the Singleton reasoning is flawed," and finding "that the offense of being a felon in possession of
a firearm is a crime of violence for purposes of the Bail Reform Act").
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VI. POSNER WEIGHS IN ON THE ISSUE

21 5

The most interesting, albeit somewhat flawed, opinion on this
topic is the panel decision authored by Judge Richard Posner of
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Lane.1 6 Lane
did not deal with issue of pretrial detention under the Bail Reform
Act, but rather the issue of detention following conviction and
pending sentencing, which is also influenced by whether an offense is classified as a "crime of violence." In particular, detention
is presumed following a conviction for a "crime of violence" under
the Bail Reform Act absent a showing of exceptional circum217
stances. Where an offense is not a "crime of violence" or a certain
type of narcotics crime, the standard for release is much more forgiving, allowing for release if the defendant can show by clear and
convincing evidence that some set of conditions of release exist
that will assure 21both
his appearance as required and the safety of
8
community.
the
In Lane, Judge Posner sided with the view that a felon's possession of a firearm does not pose a substantial risk that physical force
may result from the unlawful gun possession. 2 19 He did so by dis-

secting the language of the statute, as was done in both Dillardand
Singleton, but he went out of his way to criticize the logic of the Dillard court, while overlooking significant portions of the language
and intent of the Bail Reform Act.220

Posner's first criticism went to the Dillard court's discussion of
whether a felon's possession of a firearm created a "substantial risk
that physical force against the person or property of another may
be used in the course of committing the offense," under the Bail
215. In mentioningJudge Posner by name, the author does not intend to single him out
for criticism. As with many of the opinions authored by Judge Posner, the panel opinion discussed in this section, United States v. Lane, 252 F.3d 905 (7th Cir. 2001), has already been linked
by courts and other commentators to Judge Posner. See, e.g., United States v. Plakio, No. 0140084-01 RDR, 2001 WL 1167305, at *2 (D. Kan. Sept. 5, 2001); NicoleJ. Bredefeld, Note, The
Bail Reform Act of 1984 and Felons Who Possess Weapons: Discrepancy Among the Federal Courts, 26
SErON HALL LEGIs.J. 215, 248 (2001). To the extent that this Article is critical of the Lanedecision, the criticism is motivated by whatJudge Roger Miner of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit labeled "a duty on the part of lawyers to identify and discuss incorrect
actions by the courts, subject only to the requirement that the criticism be impelled by a
good-faith desire for the improvement in the law and the legal system." RogerJ. Miner, Criticizing the Courts:A Lawyer's Duty, 29-APR COLO. LAW. 31, 31 (Apr. 2000).
216. 252 E3d 905 (7th Cir. 2001).
217. See 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a) (2) (2003).
218. See 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(1) (2003).
219. Lane, 252 F.3d at 906.
220. Id. at 907-08.
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Reform Act.2 21 In analyzing the Dillard court's approach to the issue, Posner focused on the distinction between the possession of
tools of a crime and the actual commission of that crime:
The Second Circuit in Dillardasked whether felons do a lot of
violence with the weapons they possess illegally, and answered
"yes," leading to the conclusion that the risk of violence created by being a felon in possession is substantial. But the
statute asks whether there is a "substantial risk that physical
force against the person or property of another may be used
in the course of committing the offense," and the offense is possession of a firearm. People who commit that offense may end
up committing another, and violent, offense, such as robbing
a bank at gunpoint, but that doesn't make the possession offense violent. Otherwise we would have to say that the offense
of driving a car without a license is a crime of violence because people who commit that offense are likely to drive when
drunk, or to speed, or to drive recklessly, or attempt to evade
arrest.... A crime that increases the likelihood of a crime of
violence need not itself be a crime of violence. Bailey v. United
States, 516 U.S. 137, 116 S. Ct. 501, 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995), is
suggestive. The Supreme Court distinguished simple possession of a weapon from use in the sense of active use, limiting
the statutory term "use" to the active variety. The active use of
a gun is a crime of violence in a way that mere possession of it,
even if criminal, is not. Dillard bespeaks a type of pre-Bailey
understanding of possession and use as being essentially iden222
tical crimes.
Although the Lane court's analysis may be compelling, it is compelling only when viewed outside of the context of the Bail Reform
Act's full definition of "crime of violence." When viewed in the
context of the Act's full definition, it becomes clear that Judge
Posner failed to consider or even mention the fact that the Bail
Reform Act expressly distinguishes between crimes that are inherently violent and those that merely possess the substantial
likelihood that violence may result during their commission.223 Accordingly, comparing a crime like a felon's possession of a
handgun with the active use of that handgun, is like comparing
221.
222.
223.

Id. at 907.
Id. at 907-08.
See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
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apples with oranges. The active use of a firearm, as would be contemplated under a Bailey definition of use, would clearly fall into
the Bail Reform Act's first category of violent crimes, namely that
applicable to offenses "that ha[ve] [as] an element ...the use, at-

tempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person
or property of another."224 If Congress had intended to limit the

Bail Reform Act's "crime of violence" definition to only those
crimes that inherently involve violence, attempted violence, or the
threat of violence, the Act's definition would have stopped after
only one paragraph. Instead, Congress elected to incorporate into
2 25
the definition crimes for which the link to violence is less direct.

Moreover, the Lane court's criticism of Dillards reliance on firearm possession as a predicate for detention, as opposed to the
actual use of such a firearm, ignores the very language Congress
used in passing the Bail Reform Act of 1984. In the Conference
Report accompanying the passage of the Act, Congress expressly
listed possession of a weapon as a factor that "tend[s] to indicate
that the defendant will pose a danger to the safety of the community if released."226 Posner's criticisms of DUllardwere also misplaced

insofar as the "crime of violence" provisions of the Bail Reform Act
do not generally bear on whether a detention hearing is appropriate for the type of offense at issue in Bailey, the using or carrying of
a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence or a drug
trafficking offense.227 Such offenses, which are charged under Title
18, United States Code, Section 924(c), are accounted for in the
Bail Reform Act at Section 3142(e), wherein Congress provided
that such a crime should trigger a rebuttable presumption of detention. 225 Indeed, Congress spoke to this particular issue in the
224.
225.

18 U.S.C. § 3156(a) (4) (A) (2003).
See 18 U.S.C. § 3156(a) (4) (B) (2003).

226. COMPREHENSIVE CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1984, S.REP. No. 98-225, at 22, reprinted
in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3205.
227. See generally Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995) (addressing the meaning of
the term "use" in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)'s prohibition against the use or carrying of a
firearm during or in relation to a drug trafficking offense or a crime of violence), superseded,
in part, by statute in the Act to Throttle Criminal Use of Guns, Pub. L. No. 105-386, 112 Stat.
3469 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (2003)). See also 144 CONG. REc. S12670-02 (daily
ed. Oct. 16, 1998) (statement of Sen. DeWine) (discussing how the "Bailey Fix Act" was
meant to embrace not only instances of brandishing, firing or displaying a firearm during a
crime of violence or drug trafficking offense, but also to those situations where a defendant
kept a firearm available to provide security for the transaction, its fruit or proceeds, or was
otherwise emboldened by its presence in the commission of the offense).
228. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (2003). The statute reads:

Subject to rebuttal by the person, it shall be presumed that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required
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Senate Report accompanying the Act, wherein it stated that "obvious considerations based upon the inherent dangers in
committing a felony using a firearm support a rebuttable presumption for detention."'2 In light of these clear faults in the Lane
decision, Judge Posner's assault on the Dillard decision should be
rejected as poorly reasoned and wide of the mark.

VII. A

STUDY IN CONTRAST: THE RELATIVE UNIFORMITY OF CASE

LAW ADDRESSING WHETHER POSSESSION OF RESTRICTED FIREARMS
(E.G., SHORT BARRELED SHOTGUNS) CONSTITUTES
A "CRIME OF VIOLENCE"

Most cases addressing unlawful firearms possession under the
Bail Reform Act have looked at felon-in-possession offenses. 23 0 A
smaller number, however, have addressed whether the possession
of restricted firearms constitutes a "crime of violence" under the
Bail Reform Act. 23' Restricted firearms cases generally deal with vio-

lations of Title 26, United States Code, Section 5861, which forbids
the possession of certain classes of unregistered firearms.,32 Section
5861 sets forth a variety of criminal tax violations that relate to a
person's failure to register certain types of weapons or to pay the
requisite tax for registration.233 The types of weapons covered by

and the safety of the community if the judicial officer finds that there is probable
cause to believe that the person committed ... an offense under section 924(c) ... of
title 18 of the United States Code.
Id.
229. COMPREHENSIVE CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1984, S. REP. No. 98-225, at 20, reprinted
in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3203.
230. See supra notes 111, 150, and 153.
231.
See United States v. Newman, No. 97-1294, 1997 WL 603740 (10th Cir. Oct. 1,
1997); United States v. Stratton, No. CR. 00-0431 PHX SMM, CR 01-0152 PHX SMM, 2001
WL 527442 (D. Ariz. Apr. 24, 2001); United States v. Butler, 165 F.R.D. 68 (N.D. Ohio 1996);
United States v. Crawford, No. 95-CR-169, 1995 WL 311345 (N.D.N.Y. May 16, 1995); United
States v. Dodge, 842 F. Supp. 643 (D. Conn. 1994), affd, 846 F. Supp. 181 (D. Conn. 1994),
affd, 61 F.3d 142 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Sloan, 820 F. Supp. 1133 (S.D. Ind. 1993);
United States v. Kruszewski, No. 91-0031P, 1991 WL 268684 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 10, 1991);
United States v. Aiken, 775 F. Supp. 855 (D. Md. 1991); United States v. Spires, 755 F. Supp.
890 (C.D. Cal. 1991).
232. See, e.g., Aiken, 775 F. Supp. at 855 (discussing the application of the Bail Reform
Act to a defendant charged with, inter alia, possessing an unregistered sawed-off shotgun in
violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861 (d)).
233. See 26 U.S.C. § 5861(a)-(1) (2003). Section 5861 is part of the National Firearms
Act, which is codified at 26 U.S.C. § 5801 et seq. When Congress passed that Act, it "estab-
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Section 5861 include short-barreled shotguns, firearm silencers,
34
machine guns, and "destructive devices.",
Under the law, these
23 5

weapons are all classified as "firearms.
Courts addressing the unlawful possession of restricted "firearms" have uniformly held that such possession is a "crime of
violence" for the purposes of triggering a detention hearing under
the Bail Reform Act. 2 6 In so holding, courts have reasoned that

restricted classes of firearms are inherently dangerous and have no
legitimate, peaceful purpose.3 7 Based on this reasoning, these
courts have concluded that the unlawful possession of such weapons constitutes a "substantial risk" of physical force so as to qualify

lished a regulatory structure for the taxation of certain classes of firearms." United States v.
Dodge, 61 E3d 142, 145 (2d Cir. 1995).
234. As explained by the magistrate judge in Dodge.
Not every firearm need be registered with the Department of the Treasury's National
Firearms Registration and Transfer Record. The only firearms which must be registered are "firearms" within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. § 5845. As used in that section,
the term "firearm" includes machineguns, sawed-off shotguns, sawed-off rifles, silencers, and "destructive devices." 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a) (7) & (8).
842 F. Supp. at 644.
235. See 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a) (2003) (including in the definition of "firearm" such
weapons as short-barreled rifles and shotguns, machineguns, firearm silencers, and destructive devices). Section 5845(a) was explained by the magistrate judge in the Dodge opinion:
The term "firearm" is narrowly defined in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a) to include only those
weapons and devices which Congress believed to be either so inherently dangerous
and lacking in legitimate utilitarian purpose, or so susceptible to misuse in criminal
activities that they should not be possessed by private citizens freely and without federal regulation.
842 F. Supp. at 644.
236. See, e.g., Newman, 1997 WL 603740, at *1 (finding that possession of unregistered
pipe bombs in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861 constitutes a "crime of violence" under the Bail
Reform Act so as to require a detention hearing); Stratton, 2001 WL 527442, at *3 (concluding that the possession of an unregistered short-barreled shotgun constitutes a "crime of
violence" under the Bail Reform Act); Dodge, 846 F. Supp. at 183-84 (finding that possession
of an unregistered silencer and an unregistered pipe bomb constitutes "crime of violence"
under Bail Reform Act).
237. See, e.g., Dodge, 846 F. Supp. at 184 ("[Bloth a silencer and a pipe bomb are inherently dangerous weapons for which no peaceful purpose can be seriously suggested,
regardless of whether the weapons actually are used."); cf United States v. Lane, 252 F.3d
905, 907 (7th Cir. 2001) ("Some firearms, it is true-for example, sawed-off shotguns-have
no significant lawful use, and so their possession by felons may well constitute a crime of
violence ....
").
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as a "crime of violence" under the definition listed at Title 18,
United States Code, Section 3156 (a) (4) (B) .
The case authorities discussed above are not in dispute. For example, Judge Posner expressed agreement with the rationale of
those cases in his opinion in Lane.55 Despite this lack of dispute,
there seems to be little reason to justify one view of persons who
possess prohibited firearms and a contrasting view of persons who
are prohibited from possessing firearms. Although some judgeslike Judge Posner in Lane-argue that felons who possess firearms
are not always more likely to use violence,"' the same argument can
be made for those who possess unregistered "firearms" under the
National Firearms Act. Absent empirical data or case-specific information, 41 it is not possible to say whether an otherwise law-abiding
person with an unregistered machinegun is more or less likely to
engage in violence than a felon or domestic abuser who unlawfully
possesses a handgun. A machinegun may be a more potent weapon
238. See, e.g., Newman, 1997 WL 603740, at *1 (concluding that the possession of an unregistered "firearm" in violation of the National Firearms Act constitutes a "crime of
violence" under the Bail Reform Act).
239. Lane, 252 F.3d at 907 ("Some firearms, it is true-for example, sawed-off shotguns-have no significant lawful use, and so their possession by felons may well constitute a
crime of violence ..... ).
240. See, e.g., United States v. Singleton, 182 F.3d 7, 15 (D.C. Cir. 1999) ("[N]ot all felons are potentially more violent than non-felons."). In Lane, the court questions:
A person who has been convicted of committing a felony (and has not been pardoned) is no doubt more likely to make an illegal use of a firearm than a nonfelon,
and the illegal use is likely to involve violence. Otherwise it would be a little difficult
to see why being a felon in possession of a firearm is a crime. But is the risk substantial? And for all felonies other than those ... excepted from the reach of section
9

22(g)(1) ... ?

252 F.3d at 906.
241. It is telling that the Singleton court faulted the prosecution and the so-called
"majority view" opinions for presuming that armed felons pose a substantial risk of violence
because such a theory is "laden with factual assumptions for which the government offers no
empirical support." Singleton, 182 F.3d at 14. Notwithstanding the Singleton court's criticism,
there is ample empirical evidence of recidivism among felons, including violent felons.
According to a June 2002 special report from the Bureau of Justice Statistics, 67.5% of
prisoners who were released from prison were rearrested for a new felony or serious
misdemeanor offense within three years. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT: RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN

1994 1 (June 2002) (on

file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). Among prisoners with the
highest rearrest rates were those who were in prison for "possessing, using, or selling illegal
weapons (70.2%)." Id. Violent offenders were 61.7% more likely to be rearrested for a new
offense within three years. Id. at 2. Of the 272,111 prior inmates who were tracked after
being released in 1994, 67.8% had a record of violence. Id. at 5. Accordingly, the Singleton
court's reliance on the lack of empirical evidence for links to recidivism and violent
tendencies among ex-felons appears to be misplaced. Such evidence does exist.
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than a handgun, but its potential will not be unleashed sitting on a
gun collector's shelf. Conversely, a small caliber derringer could
wreak havoc in the hands of a violent criminal. Without an evidentiary hearing, the relative difference in the risk of violence cannot
accurately be known.242 Accordingly, the judicial distinction between crimes involving restricted weapons and crimes involving
people restricted from possessing weapons seems artificial and ignores the reality that a gun, whatever its type, is more likely to
cause violence when left in the wrong hands. 4 ' This is especially
true under the Bail Reform Act, where the defendant, not the
weapon, is being evaluated for potential danger to the communty.244

VIII.

GUIDANCE PROVIDED BY THE GUN CONTROL
ACT OF

1968

A. The Gun Control Act
To determine whether firearms crimes fall within the "crime of
violence" definition contained in the Bail Reform Act, one can
look to the legislative history of that Act, which is only partially instructive, or one can look more broadly at Congress' perception of
the risks inherent in the sorts of firearms possession offenses at issue. If one endeavors to do the latter, it becomes clear that, in
prohibiting firearms possession by certain individuals and restricting

242. In United States v. Silva, 133 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Mass. 2001), a magistrate judge
reasoned that the felon-in-possession offense is not a crime of violence because not every
felon is dangerous: "To be sure, many felons have committed violent offenses. Perhaps there
is something in their nature, whether innate or acquired, biological or social, that has led
them down the path of violence and mayhem. But it is the individuality of that person that is
key to that dangerousness...." Id. at 112. The same logic can be applied to possessors of
unregistered firearms, especially those without criminal histories. Yet under the Bail Reform
Act's categorical approach to "crimes of violence," possession of unregistered firearms is
always considered violent. The felon-in-possession offense may not be so regarded. Both
crimes, however, are premised on a risk of potential violence. See discussion of Gun Control
Act, infra notes 246-64 and accompanying text. Accordingly, defendants in both classes of
cases should qualify for a detention hearing to determine whether their "individuality" reveals "something in their nature" that makes them dangerous.
243. United States v. Aiken, 775 F. Supp. 855, 856-57 (D. Md. 1991) ("This Court is also
concerned that there is an increased risk that a criminally-inclined individual will be more
likely to use a firearm already in his possession to commit another crime.").
244. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e),(g) (2003) (discussing the factors that courts should consider in determining whether detention is appropriate).
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the possession of certain classes of firearms, Congress was concerned with preventing gun violence.245
Congress made its first earnest strides into federal gun control
with the passage of the Gun Control Act of 1968.246 Although fed-

eral firearms legislation was passed prior to that Act, such
legislation dealt narrowly with the organized crime and gang problems of Prohibition and the 1930s247 and, thereafter, the war

surplus importation boom following the Second World War.
Those pieces of legislation dealt more with the risks inherent in
the possession of certain types of firearms, e.g. dangerous firearms
like machine guns, rather than placing prohibitions on gun ownership by classes of individuals.249 Until 1968, nothing was enacted at
the federal level to address the general risks of violence inherent in
gun possession by troublesome individuals, as distinguished from
prior federal regulation and restriction of certain types of firearms
and firearm transactions.250 The Gun Control Act of 1968 did, however, focus on preventing gun violence, and the history of the Act
demonstrates the origins and significance of the Act's prohibitions.

245. See GUN CONTROL ACT OF 1968, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 90-1577, at 4412 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4410, 4412 ("This increasing rate of crime and lawlessness and
the growing use of firearms in violent crime clearly attest to a need to strengthen Federal
regulation of interstate firearms traffic."); see also 131 CONG. REc. S9169 (daily ed. July 9,
1985) (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("[W]hen Congress enacted the Gun Control Act of 1968,
its intent was to reduce violent crime.").
246. See William J. Vizzard, The Gun ControlAct of 1968, 18 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. Rav. 79,
84 (Symposium 1999) (explaining that "[a]t no time before or since [passage of the Gun
Control Act] has Congress addressed gun control policy with as much breadth or depth,"
and that "[t]itle VII [of the Act] addressed simple firearm possession for the first time at the
federal level").
247. See Sen. Richard J. Durbin, Taking Guns Seriously: Common Sense Gun Control to Keep
Guns out of the Hands of Kids and Criminals, 18 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 1, 3 (Symposium

1999) ("Support for the first national gun law, the National Firearms Act of 1934, grew during the 1920's and the era of Prohibition as a way to ,stop widespread mobster shootings and
turf wars. The law imposed a tax of $200 on the transfer of any machine gun or sawed off
shotgun.").
248. See Vizzard, supra note 246, at 79 ("Clearly protectionist, the legislation targeted
the increase in imported firearms, the great majority of which were military surplus.").
249. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 90-1956, at 4412 (1968), reprintedin 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4426,
4434 (referring to the 1934 legislation and its coverage and stating "[t]he present National
Firearms Act covers gangster-type weapons such as machineguns, sawed-off shotguns, shortbarreled shotguns, mufflers, and silencers").
250. See Vizzard, supra note 246, at 84 (explaining that the Gun Control Act of 1968
"addressed simple firearm possession for the first time at the federal level").
251. GUN CONTROL ACT OF 1968, H.R. CON. REP. No. 90-1577, at 4412 (1968),.reprinted
in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4410, 4412 (beginning the "general statement" of the Conference
Report with a discussion of how the "increasing rate of crime and lawlessness and the grow-
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B. Background to the Gun Control Act
The legislative history of the Gun Control Act demonstrates
that is was motivated by public concerns about the misuse of firearms and the growing rate of violent crime.12 Aside from the
actual comments of the proponents of the Act, which will be detailed below, the historical backdrop of the Act shows many of the
events and concerns motivating the desire for heightened gun
control. Although this Article will not retrace the full history of
growing crime and violence during the 1960s, it is worth noting
that during the years leading up to the passage of the Act, a sitting President and numerous, civil rights leaders were
assassinated. 53 Just weeks before the passage of the Act, and during its discussion and consideration in Congress, guns were used
to kill Dr. Martin Luther King and presidential candidate and
United States Senator Robert Kennedy. 54 As explained by one
commentator: "After the 1968 assassinations of Robert Kennedy
and Martin Luther King a groundswell of visible support for more
decisive federal action temporarily materialized."' 55
The impact of these assassinations can be seen in the comments of those initiating the legislation. For example, Senator
Russell Long, who proposed that portion of the Act that gave rise
to the current felon-in-possession statute, explained the purpose
and motivation of his proposed statute in a prepared statement
he read into the record on the floor of the Senate:
Of all of the gun bills that have been suggested,'debated, discussed and considered, none except this Title VII attempts
to bar possession of a firearm from persons whose prior behaviors have established their violent tendencies....
Under Title VII, every citizen could possess a gun until the
commission of his first felony. Upon his conviction, however,

ing use of firearms in violent crime clearly attest to a need to strengthen Federal regulation
of interstate firearms traffic").
252. See id.
253. See, e.g., Jim E Couch & William F. Shugart, Jr., Crime, Gun Control, and the BATE The PoliticalEcononryof Law Enforcement, 30 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 617, 620 (2003) (discussing how the Gun
Control Act of 1968 was "[p] assed in the wake of the assassinations of PresidentJohn E Kennedy
and Dr. Martin Luther KingJr.").
254. See Vizzard, supra note 246, at 83.
255. Id.at85.
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Title VII would deny every assassin, murderer, thief and burglar of the right to possess a firearm in the future....
Despite all that has been said about the need for controlling
firearms in this Country, no other amendment heretofore
offered would get at the Oswalds or the Galts.
They are the
56
types of people at which Title VII is aimed.1
Although rife with the hyperbole characteristic of hot button
political debate, the motivation behind Senator Long's proposal
is clear. References to the prevalence of firearm violence can be
found throughout the legislative debate surrounding the Act's
passage and elsewhere in the congressional reports accompanying the Act's passage. For example, the House Report, which was
issued just sixteen days after the assassination of Robert Kennedy
led off its "general statement" section with a statement
about how the "increasing rate of crime and lawlessness and the
growing use of firearms in violent crime clearly attest to a need to
strengthen Federal regulation of interstate firearms traffic."25 8 In
support of that statement, the Report then proceeded to lay out
the types of firearms violence that the Act was intended to address and hopefully prevent:
Handguns, rifles, and shotguns have been the chosen means
to execute three-quarters of a million people in the United
States since 1900. The use of firearms in violent crimes continues to increase today. Statistics indicated that 50 lives are
destroyed by firearms each day. In the 13 months ending in
September 1967 guns were involved in more than 6,500
murders, 10,000 suicides, 2,600 accidental deaths, 43,500 aggravated assaults, and 50,000 robberies. No civilized society
can ignore
the malignancy which this senseless slaughter re259

flects.

Even with all other indicators of legislative intent, the comments of Senator Long, as the primary drafter of the legislation,
appear to be the most salient on the question of intent. Indeed,
256. 114 CONG. REc. 14,773-74 (1968) (statement of Sen. Long).
257. The House Report was issued on June 21, 1968. See H.R. REP. No. 90-1577 (1968), rprinted in 1968 U.S.C.CAN. 4410. Senator Kennedy was assassinated on June 5, 1968. See, e.g,
Vizzard, supra note 246, at 83.
258. H.R. REP. No. 90-1577, at 4412 (1968), eprintedin 1968 U.S.C.CAN. 4410,4412.
259. Id. at 4413.
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just three years after the passage of the Act, the Supreme Court
revisited the Act's passage and legislative history, and noted the
comments of Senator Russell Long, who proposed that portion of
the Act that gave rise to the current felon-in-possession statute.
The Court summarized Senator Long's comments in the following way: "On the Senate floor, Senator Long, who introduced
§ 1202, described various evils that prompted his statute. These
evils included assassinations of public figures and threats to the
operation of businesses significant enough in the aggregate to
affect commerce.",2 6 In his prepared statement promoting his bill,

Senator Long gave a very clear picture of the concerns underlying
his proposal to outlaw firearms possession by certain classes of
people:
This proposed title would make it a Federal crime for the
following classes of persons to receive, possess, or transport
any firearm in commerce, or affecting commerce:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Convicted felons.
Persons discharged from the Military under other
than honorable conditions.
Mental incompetents.
Persons who have renounced their United States
citizenships [sic].
Aliens illegally in this Country.

Clauses 1-5 describe persons who, by their actions, have
demonstrated that they are dangerous, or that they may become dangerous. Simply stated, they may not be trusted
to
26
possess a firearm without becoming a threat to society.

1

Based upon the foregoing, it is clear that Senator Long's proposal, which was passed by Congress in substantially the same
form as described above, was motivated by concerns about the
danger to society inherent in the possession of firearms by the
likes of prior felons, the mentally ill, and those who have

260. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 345 (1971) (citing 114
14,772-75 (1968)).
261. 114 CoNG. REc. 14,773 (1968) (statement of Sen. Long).

CONG.

REc. 13,868-71,
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renounced their United States citizenship. 262 In the words of Senator Long, "[t]heir
very acts show that society must be protected
263

from them.

IX. TYING IT ALL

TOGETHER

In light of the purposes underlying the Bail Reform Act, there
should be little question about whether the Act should allow for a
safety-based detention hearing in cases involving unlawful possession of firearms by prohibited persons. Failing Congressional
intervention to change the Act's disputed language, however, the
salient issue is somewhat different. At issue is whether the Act, in
fact, allows for such a hearing. The answer to that question appears
to be the same as the answer to the general policy question posed
above, despite the acknowledged ambiguity in the Act's language.
After all, the language of the Act's "crime of violence" definition
appears to be expansive, expressed in a manner covering not only
those crimes directly linked to the use of force (i.e., where force is
an element), but also "any other offense" bearing a substantial risk
that the use of force may be used in the course of that offense.264
With this broad, albeit somewhat ambiguous, definition, it should
be clear that the Bail Reform Act was not intended to preclude a
detention hearing in those borderline
cases where physical force,
26 5
while not inevitable, "may be used."

While this uncertainty in statutory language may suggest, but not
compel, a broad "crime of violence" definition .that encompasses
firearms possession offenses, the legislative history resolves this
uncertainty. The legislative commentary to the Act repeatedly
makes clear that the Act's principal concern was with the prior
law's failure to give judges the authority or flexibility to consider a
defendant's dangerousness or the community's safety in evaluating
detention. Indeed, in its commentary to the 1984 Act, Congress
bluntly stated that "it is intolerable that the law denies judges the

262. Subsequent Congressional debate on amendments to the Gun Control Act further confirms that the Act was aimed at curbing violent acts by armed felons and other prohibited persons.
As Senator Hatch of Utah stated in a 1985 debate on the Federal Firearms Owners Protection Act,
"when Congress enacted the Gun Control Act of 1968, its intent was to reduce violent crime ....
131 CONG. REC.S9169 (daily edJuly 9, 1985) (statement of Sen. Hatch).

263.

114 CONG. REc. 14,774 (1968) (statement of Sen. Long).

264.

See18 U.S.C. § 3156(a) (4) (B) (2003).

265.

Id.
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tools to make honest and appropriate
decisions regarding the
2 66
release of [dangerous] defendants."

Aside from these general concepts favoring a broad construction
of the Act's detention hearing qualifiers, the legislative history also
specifically favors the eligibility of firearms possession offenses for a
detention hearing. In the legislative commentary discussing the
quantum of evidence required for detention on safety grounds,
Congress expressly mentioned firearms possession. Specifically, the
Committee authoring the report that accompanied passage of the
Act stated that "if the dangerous nature of the current offense is to
be a basis of detention, then there should be evidence of the specific elements or circumstances of the offense, such as possession or
use of a weapon ... , that tend to indicate that the defendant will
pose a danger to the safety of the community if released." 261 In light

of this specific language addressing offenses involving firearms
possession, it is surprising that courts have disagreed about the
Act's application to firearms possession offenses.
The disagreement among courts is even more surprising when
the history of the Gun Control Act is considered in earnest. Indeed, it is remarkable that any court could seriously question
whether a felon in possession of a firearm should be evaluated for
potential danger to the community when the chief proponent of
the felon-in-possession prohibition made clear that his proposal
was aimed at "persons who, by their actions, have demonstrated
26
that they are dangerous, or that they may become dangerous. 8
Such indecision is even more remarkable when the same legislator
amplified his concerns by explaining that prior felons "[s]tated
simply, ... may not be 26trusted
to possess a firearm without becom9

ing a threat to society.
Although some courts have signaled a distaste for the safetybased detention of unlawful firearms possessors, as evidenced by
the Singleton court's use of the term "incapacitation" in describing
pretrial detainees, 270 the core issue here does not deal with whether
certain defendants should be detained pending trial. Rather, the
issue is whether detention can even be considered with respect to
those defendants. Even in those egregious cases of firearms possession by recidivist violent felons, be they rapists, murderers, or child
266. - COMPREHENSIVE CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1984, S. REP. No. 98-225, at 5, reprintedin
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3188.
267. Id. at 22, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3205.
268. 114 CoNG. REc. 14,773 (1968) (statement of Sen. Long).
269. Id.
270. United States v. Singleton, 182 F.3d 7,16 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
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molesters, the Bail Reform Act still puts the burden on the prosecution to prove danger to the community by clear and convincing
evidence. Accordingly, where the prosecution cannot prove a danger to the community, there is no risk of detention. It is only where
there is a demonstrable danger to the community that the so-called
minority view of courts, led by Singleton, impacts the process by denying judges the ability to consider detention.

X.

ONE LAST WRINKLE

Although the Bail Reform Act's pretrial detention provisions
generally provide for a hearing, the Act's provisions for detention
pending sentencing or appeal after a guilt finding do not:

1

In

cases where a defendant has been found guilty of certain drug trafficking offenses or any "crime of violence," detention pending
sentencing or appeal is mandatory, with very few exceptions. 72 Accordingly, a different and more serious consequence flows from
the classification of a crime as a "crime of violence" for the purpose
of detention post-trial or post-guilty plea. Thus, one of the chief
safeguards supporting the classification of unlawful firearm possession as a "crime of violence" in the pretrial context-namely that a
hearing and weighty burden of proof would still be required for
detention-is not present at the presentencing and appeal stages
of proceedings.
Dillard and its progeny generally ignore the foregoing concern
when they rely upon the safeguard of a hearing to justify including
unlawful firearms possession within the Bail Reform Act's "crime of
violence" definition. For example, the Dillard opinion incorrectly
states that "[t]he conclusion that the felon-in-possession offense is
within the definition of crime of violence does not cause the
271. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (2003) (setting forth the detention hearing procedure
for pretrial detention determinations), with 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a) (2) (2003) (mandating that
the judge order certain categories of defendants detained pending sentencing and appeal,
unless an acquittal or new trial order is likely, or the defendant does not face a sentence of
imprisonment and is unlikely to flee or pose a danger).
272. 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2) (2003).
273. See United States v. Dillard, 214 F.3d 88, 96 (2d Cir. 2000); see also United States v.
Stratton, No. CR. 00-0431 PHX SMM, CR. 01-0152 PHX SMM, 2001 WL 527442, at *3 (D.

Ariz. Apr. 24, 2001) (failing to acknowledge the complications of the Bail Reform Act at the
presentencing and appeal stages by stating that "[i]f a broader scope [of the "crime of violence" definition] is permitted, the Court can then proceed with a detention hearing,
requiring the Government to prove on a case-by-case basis by a clear and convincing standard whether the particular person before it is a danger to the community").
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defendant's detention. It does no more than cause a hearing to
consider whether the defendant is in fact dangerous (or likely to
flee) .,,274 To the contrary, such a classification can, in fact, "cause
the defendant's detention" for all post-trial and post-guilty plea
proceedings.
Section 3143(a) (2) of the Bail Reform Act mandates that, except
a few limited circumstances, "[t] he judicial officer shall order that
a person who has been found guilty of an offense in a case described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C) of subsection (f)
(1) of
section 3142 and is awaiting imposition or execution of sentence
be detained.... ,,76 Subparagraph (A) of § 3142(f) (1) pertains to
all offenses that fall within the definition of "a crime of violence."2 7
Section 3143(b) (2) provides similar language requiring the detention of such defendants pending appeal. 8
The rigid language of Section 3143 should not, however, foreclose a defendant's release pending sentencing or appeal in all
firearms possession cases, even if such offenses are classified as
crimes of violence under the Bail Reform Act. As with most other
areas relating to detention and sentencing, the law provides a
safety valve which allows a judge to release a defendant pending
sentencing or appeal if "exceptional reasons" exist to support such
a releaseY. Section 3145(c) of the Bail Reform Act provides that a
defendant detained under the restrictive provisions can be released, if such release is otherwise proper, "if it is clearly shown that
there are exceptional reasons why such person's detention would
not be appropriate." 210 Thus, if a judge is confronted with an ex-

ceptionally nonviolent or nonthreatening firearms possession case,
such as the simple possession of hunting rifles by a former felonan offense that, by design, receives lenient treatment under the
Sentencing Guidelines -the judge would retain the discretion
under the law to release the defendant on bond.
274. Dillard,214 F.3d at 96.
275. See 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a) (2) (2003).
276. Id.
277. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(A) (2003).
278. 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b) (2) (2003) ("The judicial officer shall order that a person who
has been found guilty of an offense in a case described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C) of
subsection (f)(1) of section 3142 and sentenced to a term of imprisonment, and who has
filed an appeal or petition for a writ of certiorari, be detained.").
279. 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) (2003).
280. Id.
281. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.1 (b) (2) (2002) (lowering a defendant's offense level significantly if the defendant is found to have "possessed all
ammunition and firearms solely for lawful sporting purposes or collection, and did not
unlawfully discharge or otherwise unlawfully use such firearms or ammunition").

University of MichiganJournalof Law

form

[VOL. 37:3

Although the aforementioned wrinkle in the law would reduce a
judge's ability to release certain defendants pending sentencing or
appeal if unlawful firearms possession crimes were classified as
crimes of violence, the effect would be offset by a greater judicial
discretion to address detention issues in the pretrial context.
Additionally, while judicial discretion would be limited at the
presentencing and appeal stages, judges would still retain the
ability to avoid unjust detention in "exceptional" cases. This
shifting of judicial discretion from the post-trial or post-guilty plea
stages to the beginning of proceedings makes sense. At the outset
of a case, much less is known about a particular defendant or the
specifics of his crime. A judge, accordingly, needs to be given the
leeway at this preliminary stage to make detention decisions after
hearing evidence about the defendant and his crime. After a
defendant's guilt has been established, the same degree of judicial
discretion is not needed. This reality is reflected in the law, which
shifts during the post-guilt phase away from the flexible procedures
which effectively favor release in most cases. During post-guilt
proceedings, detention is presumed in all cases where imprisonment
is likely and the burden is placed on the defendant to prove why he
or she should be detained.
Moreover, as mentioned above,
detention is very nearly compelled by law in certain drug and all
violent felony cases.8 3 This reduction in the discretion afforded
courts comports with Judge Posner's observation in Lane that
"[o]nce the defendant has been convicted, the likelihood of a
miscarriage of justice is much less and so the conditions of release
are much tighter."28 4 Thus, while the much-needed increase in

judicial discretion at the outset of proceedings may lessen judicial
discretion in the post-guilt phase, such a reduction is far from
absolute and is fully consistent with the language and spirit of the
Bail Reform Act. Accordingly, the one last wrinkle created by the
inclusion of unlawful firearms crimes in the "crime of violence"
definition should not stand in the way of giving judges the ability to
hold pretrial detention hearings to gauge whether individual gun
criminals pose a danger to the community.

282. See 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(1) (2003) (mandating that the judge "shall order" the detention of any defendant "who has been found guilty and is awaiting imposition or
execution of sentence" unless there is "clear and convincing evidence" that the defendant
"is not likely to flee or pose a danger to the safety of any other person or the community if
released").
283. See 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a) (2) (2003).
284. United States v. Lane, 252 F.3d 905, 908 (7th Cir. 2001).
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XI. CONCLUSION

When making bail determinations, judges should be allowed to
evaluate the danger posed by those accused of unlawful firearms
possession. Where Congress has proscribed the possession of firearms, it has done so based on the perceived danger inherent in the
types of firearms it has restricted and the categories of individuals
it has barred from possessing them. This legislative perception of
danger militates strongly in favor of classifying firearms possession
offenses as "crime[s] of violence" under the Bail Reform Act of
1984. After all, the primary purpose behind the Bail Reform Act
was to give judges the ability to consider a defendant's danger to
the community in making bail determinations.
Accordingly, the restrictive interpretation given by some courts
to the Act's "crime of violence" language should be rejected as inconsistent with both the Act's language and purpose. A better
approach is to give courts the ability to hold detention hearings to
evaluate the danger posed by those who unlawfully possess firearms. Such an approach not only better implements the Bail
Reform Act's intended purpose, but it also acknowledges the reality that Congress recognized in outlawing various types of firearms
possession, namely that certain individuals and weapons pose a
threat to the safety of the community if left unregulated.

